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Abstract
This paper studies how nancial distress a¤ects competition and how incumbent bankruptcy a¤ects the
growth of rivals, specically in the context of airline bankruptcies. I begin by studying whether bankrupt
airlines put competitive pressures on rivals by cutting fares and maintaining or expanding capacity on
the 1000 most popular domestic routes from 1998-2008. The results suggest that, although bankrupt
legacy airlines reduce fares, they also reduce capacities signicantly. Low-cost carrier (LCC) rivals do
not match the fare cuts and expand capacities by 13-18% above trend growth. The signicant capacity
reductions associated with legacy airline bankruptcies create growth opportunities for LCC rivals. This
indicates the existence of barriers that have limited LCCs from expanding faster and more extensively.
The LCC expansion during rivalsbankruptcies is even greater when I consider the 200 most popular
airports instead of the 1000 most popular routes. During legacy airlinesbankruptcy, non-LCC rivals
reduce capacities on the routes a¤ected by the bankruptcy but expand at the a¤ected airports. A likely
explanation for this result is that non-LCCs avoid bankruptcyroutes as more competitive pressure is
expected with increasing presence of LCCs, but they pick up the gates or time slots given up by the
bankrupt airlines to expand on other routes. On balance the total route capacity on the 1000 popular
routes shows only a modest decrease during bankruptcy and eventually recovers, but the capacity mix
changes in favor of LCCs. Overall, I nd little evidence that distressed airlines toughen competition
and lower industry protability. LCCs capacity growth during legacy rivalsbankruptcy suggests the
existence of market frictions in competition.
1 Introduction
This paper studies two separate but related topics by examining airline bankruptcies: one is the link
between nancial distress and market competition and the other is sticky market shares and new entrants
growth. In particular, we are interested in how bankrupt airlines behave, how their rivals respond, and
how the industry changes as a result in the periods surrounding bankruptcies. The changes in market
outcome over the course of bankruptcy inform how bankruptcy a¤ects the strategic decisions of bankrupt
airlines and their rivals and how incumbent airline bankruptcies a¤ect the growth of their rivals. In
addition, the di¤erences in responses between di¤erent types of rivals will shed light on market structure
in the industry.
We begin by studying whether bankrupt airlines harm their rivals to see how nancial distress a¤ects
competition. In the United States, bankruptcies do not necessarily mean going out of business altogether.
Unlike the liquidation bankruptcy of Chapter 7, Chapter 11 permits bankrupt rms to keep operating
as a going-concern while reorganizing themselves under protection from creditors. Since Chapter 11 has
been more of a rule than an exception in the airline industry and entering Chapter 11 can allow an
airline to shed costs, critics have alleged that ine¢ cient, bankrupt airlines survive and possibly harm even
their healthier counterparts by lowering fares below what rivals charge and maintaining capacity. That
is, it is often claimed that bankrupt airlines enjoy cost reductions by renegotiating contracts and hurt
rivalsprotability by triggering fare wars and contributing to the chronic overcapacity problem of the
industry. The ideas behind these arguments and related theories are detailed in Section 1.2. We focus
on the potential harms of bankrupt airlines to rivals, especially by those of legacy carriersbankruptcy to
the low-cost carrier (LCC) rivals,1 and examine whether those harms are realistic. In particular, we are
interested in whether bankrupt airlines put competitive pressures on rivals to charge lower fares or shrink
operations by cutting fares and maintaining or expanding capacities.
To evaluate the e¤ect of own bankruptcy and the e¤ect of the exposure of airlines to rivalsbankruptcy,
we use panel data of fare and capacity on the 1000 most popular domestic routes for 42 quarters from
1998:Q1 to 2008:Q2. First, we examine how fares and capacities set by bankrupt airlines and their rivals
change in pre-, during-, and post-bankruptcy periods, starting three quarters prior to a bankruptcy ling
up to the end of the sampling period. In addition, since bankrupt airlines tend to reduce capacity (to cut
total expenses) not only by cutting services on routes but also by withdrawing from routes altogether,
we account for the exit of bankrupt airlines from routes and examine how fares and capacities of rivals
change after the exit. To supplement the analysis, we also use the capacity data at the 200 most popular
airports during the same period. We examine whether the total route capacity changes on balance over
the course of bankruptcy.2
The empirical model is based on the assumption that the relative changes in fares and capacities set
by bankrupt airlinesrivals are proportional to the degree of bankrupt airlinesmarket presence on a route
in normal times, which allows for the e¤ect to be di¤erent depending on the degree of exposure to a rivals
bankruptcy. Likewise, we assume that the relative changes in the total route capacity are proportional
to the market presence of bankrupt airlines on the route in normal times. We also divide the cases based
on whether the bankrupt airline is a legacy carrier and whether bankrupt airlines rival is a LCC.
For legacy airline bankruptcies, we nd that (1) bankrupt airlines cut fares as well as capacities
signicantly prior to bankruptcy ling and keep lower levels throughout bankruptcy procedures; (2) LCC
rivals lower fares marginally only in the quarter of bankruptcy ling and then quickly return to normal
1There is no standard denition of a legacy or a low-cost carrier (LCC). A legacy carriergenerally refers to an incumbent
airline that has existed prior to the Airline Deregulation Act 1978 and primarily operates a hub-and-spoke system with an
extensive route networks. A low-cost carrier, on the other hand, generally refers to a relatively new airline which o¤ers
relatively cheap tickets with a low cost level and primarily provides point-to-point services. The terms legacy carriers, network
carriers, and full-service airlines are often used interchangeably. Meanwhile, LCCs, point-to-point carriers, low-fare carriers,
discount airlines, and no-frills carriers are usually di¤erent names for the same carrier group. See the Table 1 in Section 3.1
for the list of airlines by carrier group.
2Most airline bankruptcies were Chapter 11 lings. Many large legacy airline bankruptcies occurred only after 2000, and
all of those lings were Chapter 11. While the data does not directly show the e¤ect of immediate liquidation of a large
legacy airline, we can expect what would have happened to the total route capacity under Chapter 7 by looking at what
actually happened under Chapter 11 as bankrupt airlines, even when not liquidated, cut their capacities signicantly.
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fares during bankruptcy; (3) LCC rivals expand capacities and market shares over the course of bankruptcy
and the LCC expansion is greater on the routes where bankrupt airlines used to have a larger market
share; (4) non-LCC rivals tend to shrink on the routes where legacy carriers are bankrupt but expand at
the airports where legacy carriers are bankrupt, indicating that they are picking up the gates and slots the
bankrupt airlines are giving up but avoiding competition on bankruptcyroutes. A likely explanation for
this behavior is the expectation of rising competition with increasing LCC presence on those routes; (5)
average fares fall eventually after a legacy carriers bankruptcy or exit from a route, indicating toughened
competition after, rather than during, bankruptcies. A likely explanation for this result is the increased
presence of LCCs; and lastly, (6) the total route capacity shows a modest decrease in terms of the number
of available seats over the course of bankruptcy and the number of scheduled ights is mostly una¤ected
during bankruptcy and even increasing in the post-bankruptcy periods, implying the replacement of large
aircrafts with smaller ones. This suggests either that the overcapacity problem does not exist or that
outright liquidation may provide a temporary resolution of the overcapacity problem, if any, but it will
not be permanent as other airlines will expand to ll the gap. In sum, the ndings uncover no evidence
that bankrupt airlines toughen competition.
The ndings are largely consistent with the previous studies on bankrupt airlines and their rivals,
although previous research does not focus on the di¤erent responses between di¤erent groups of bankrupt
airlines and rivals. Borenstein and Rose (1995) nd that fare cuts by bankruptcy-ling airlines start
prior to the actual ling but dissipate quickly during bankruptcy, and their rivals do not change fares
signicantly during the same period. The closest research to this paper, Ciliberto and Schenone (2008),
looked at the changes in fare and capacity during and after Chapter 11 bankruptcies. They nd that
bankrupt airlinesrivals do not cut fares to match bankrupt airlinesfares. They also report that bankrupt
airlines reduce capacity but their rivals marginally reduce or even increase capacity. Another paper by
Borenstein and Rose (2003) nds no signicant e¤ect of bankruptcy on total services at small and large
airports and, even at medium sized airports, the reduction is not large. Lastly, the case studies in the
U.S. General Accounting O¢ ce (2005) show that, when dominant airlines reduce capacity substantially
for some reasons such as ling for bankruptcy or dropping hub airports, the reduced capacity is quickly
lled by other airlines.
The main lesson from the empirical results is that LCCs expand while bankrupt legacy airlines reduce
capacities. The pattern of LCCsreplacement of bankrupt legacy airlines has two implications. First, the
relative cost-e¢ ciency of LCC rivals that replace bankrupt legacy airlinescapacity indicates improved
allocative e¢ ciency in production as the capacity composition changes in favor of LCCs. Second, more
importantly, our ndings suggest that the immediate and substantial capacity reduction by bankrupt
airlines presents new opportunities for their e¢ cient rivals to expand, which indicates the existence of
barriers that have limited LCC growth, aside from product heterogeneity. This approach is di¤erent from
previous analyses of LCCs that usually focus on how incumbents respond to LCC entry.3 This study
rather asks how LCCs would respond when incumbents contract under the extreme form of nancial
3For example, Goolsbee and Syverson (2004) looked at how incumbent legacy airlines set fares and capacities when
Southwest entry to a route gets more likely and suggested that the airlines lower fares to lock-in consumers through a
frequent yer program. The result indicates that a frequent yer program can be a signicant entry barrier in the airline
industry.
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distress, and thereby highlights the resilience of incumbents and the factors stimulating LCC expansion.
In the airline industry, LCC growth has been only modest considering the substantial cost advantages
over incumbent legacy airlines and the long history since the deregulation in 1978. LCCs have grown
mostly by creating and accommodating price-elastic demands that have not been served by incumbent
legacy airlines. Does the limited growth mean LCCs are inferior to legacy carriers, with cheap fare and
comparable cheap services? The growth of LCCs during legacy rivalscontraction suggests the existence
of barriers that have hindered e¢ cient entrants from taking markets away from incumbents. The barriers
can be xed resources, such as ground facilities and time slots, long-term and exclusive contracts on the
use of the resources, or consumer inertia from switching costs established by various loyalty programs.
These barriers could make it di¢ cult for even e¢ cient new entrants to challenge incumbents with a
substantial market share. Patterns of past growth of LCCs can be useful in assessing the factors that
spur or limit it. This leads us to an additional question: how large a fraction of LCC growth is spurred
by rivalsbankruptcies and capacity reduction associated with them? We estimate the fraction in Section
1.7. The magnitude of the estimates will be informative of how high the barriers are.
We attempt to quantify the growth e¤ect from rivalsbankruptcy. Based on the regression results,
we calculate the counterfactual capacity levels of LCCs in the absence of bankruptcies and compare the
counterfactual capacity growth of LCCs with the actual growth. For the entire sample of bankruptcies,
we estimate the fraction of LCC growth from rivalsbankruptcy as 13-18% of the LCC growth in 1998:Q1
through 2008:Q2 (the data period). In particular, legacy airlines bankruptcy explains about 11-17%
of the growth and other (non-legacy) airlinesbankruptcy explains about 1% of the growth. Our most
conservative estimate is over 10% of the growth. This means that the e¤ect of rivalsbankruptcy accounts
for a signicant portion of the growth, implying that barriers are not negligible.
The remainder of this paper proceeds in the following steps. Section 1.2 species the background and
motivation for the paper. Section 1.3 describes data sources and sample. Section 1.4 outlines a conceptual
framework, identication strategy, and potential biases. Section 1.5 presents econometric specications
and Section 1.6 discusses estimation results. Section 1.7 calculates the fraction of the LCC growth spurred
from rivalsbankruptcies. Finally, Section 1.8 concludes.
2 Background
This section introduces the background and motivation for the paper. There have been almost two
hundred bankruptcy lings in the airline industry. Most of the bankruptcies have been Chapter 11 lings
by small, new entrants which ended up with liquidation.4 Unlike the bankruptcies of small airlines, those
of large network carriers can have much stronger and wide-reaching e¤ects on the industry. This paper
investigates how bankruptcy a¤ects rivals strategic decisions on fare, capacity, and growth. We focus
especially on legacy airline bankruptcies and how LCC and non-LCC rivals respond to the bankruptcy.
We begin by asking whether bankrupt airlines harm rivals, especially e¢ cient ones characterized by
low cost structures, and whether the industry e¢ ciency and protability deteriorate as a result. The
following quote summarizes the worries over the potential harm of bankrupt airlines operating under
4United States General Accounting O¢ ce (2005) GAO-05-945: pp. 12-13.
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Chapter 11.
Whats wrong with Chapter 11? It may keep ailing businesses going, but it distorts the
airline industry: Chapter 11 businesses end up with unfair competitive advantages over com-
petitors, thanks to their ability to renegotiate contracts, cut costs and dump debts. Worse, the
most basic problem in the industry is excess capacity too many seats and too few customers,
something Chapter 11 doesnt help: all too often it lets airlines restructure without cutting
back capacity. This means the core problem is never resolved.
Moneyweek, Dec 12, 2005 5
Some critics alleged that entering Chapter 11 will allow ine¢ cient rms to shed costs and the bankrupt
airlines will put competitive pressure on rivals. In particular, they argue that bankrupt airlines squeeze
their rivalsprot margins and possibly harm even healthier airlinesnancial health by triggering a fare
war and maintaining capacity. There is also an argument that overcapacity has been a fundamental
problem of the industry and it would have been resolved if the bankrupt airlines were to have been
liquidated right away. We will study the link between nancial distress and market competition by
examining these arguments. As presented in the later sections, the empirical results do not support the
accusation of bankrupt airlinespotential harm to rivals and the industry. In fact, the reduced presence
of bankrupt airlines appears to open the windows of opportunity for their rivals to expand, which leads
to a question: who replaces bankrupt airlines and what fraction of the growth of replacing airlines can be
attributed to rivalsbankruptcy? We will return to this question later in this section.
In order to predict bankrupt airlines behavior and their rivals responses, we need to understand
the incentives they have. First, would nancial distress lead a rm to compete aggressively? When a
rms survival is at risk, the rm may engage in a price war in order to secure survival at the expense
of prot maximization. Hendel (1996) built a model in which nancially distressed rms use aggressive
pricing as a source of internal nancing to raise liquidity. Financially distressed rms may discount future
prots more heavily as liquidation is more likely. Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) showed that nancially
distressed rms, with a low discount factor, will not compete aggressively for market share. Empirically,
the tendency to trigger a fare war under nancial distress in the airline industry is reported by Busse
(2002). On the other hand, Chevalier (1995) examined supermarket leverage buyouts (LBOs) and found
the evidence suggesting that higher leverage lead to softer competition.
Even if bankrupt airlines reduce fares, it is unclear that the fare cuts would put competitive pres-
sure on rivals. Financial distress usually weakens airlinescompetitiveness. Whether bankrupt airlines
fare cuts will lead to tougher competition is uncertain. Financial distress may ruin a rms reputation
and.consumers may discount bankrupt airlines for safety issues, inconvenience, less valuable frequent yer
programs, or other negative perceptions about bankruptcy (Titman, 1984 and Titman & Maksimovic,
1991). Therefore, the fare discount by a bankrupt airline may not be so e¤ective that it pushes their rivals
to lower fares. On the other hand, when a rm is under nancial distress, the nancial status of rivals
will relatively improve. Then, healthy rivals may even initiate aggressive pricing so as to eliminate the
5US airlines hit turbulence - again, By Simon Wilson, Moneyweek, Dec 12, 2005
(http://www.moneyweek.com/investment-advice/us-airlines-hit-turbulence again.aspx)
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weakened bankrupt airlines that cannot a¤ord to cut fares against them (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990).
Therefore, we need to see whether and when bankrupt airlines and their rivals cut fares signicantly and
how rivals respond to a bankrupt airlines exit from a market.
Although the cost reductions achieved under bankruptcy protection may allow bankrupt rms to cut
fares below market rates, it is not obvious that bankrupt airlines will take advantage of the cost reductions
to engage in aggressive pricing. An airline usually manages to cut expenses in the bankruptcy process,
but the cost of debt will rise for the bankrupt airline when raising funds. That is, bankruptcy may also
have an opposite e¤ect on cost levels as bankrupt airlines will have to face higher costs of debt when
raising money because investors require a higher return on investment to compensate the heightened risk.
So, whether bankrupt airlines will cut fares will depend in part on how managers dene their cost levels
when setting fares. On the other hand, the reduction may not be enough for the airlines to compete with
the low fare of low cost rivals.
Now, let us think about the total capacity level. Some argue that the cost reduction under Chapter 11
may allow bankrupt airlines to maintain capacity and the bankrupt airlines should have been liquidated to
resolve the industrys chronic overcapacity problem of too many seats for too few passengers. The nature
of competition in the airline industry is indeed easy to lead to overcapacity. Morrison and Winston (1995)
pointed out cyclical demand and forecast error as main sources for overcapacity. For example, airlines
order airplanes much ahead of the time when the airplanes are used, and they are more likely to order
more airplanes when business is better than normal. The combination of huge xed cost and relatively
small marginal cost may lead airlines to supply seats as long as the fare covers variable costs, even up to
the unprotable, excessive level. The mobility of capacities between routes may worsen the problem as
airlines respond to high demand by transferring their capacities to popular routes, leading to a crowded
market even for the high demand.
Even if the overcapacity problem exists in the airline industry, it is doubtful that liquidation will solve
the problem. Outright liquidation will solve the overcapacity problem on the condition that remaining
airlines do not ll the slack after bankrupt airlines are gone. The condition will hold only if the products
of bankrupt airlines are irreplaceable or other airlines do not have incentives to expand. It is unlikely that
bankrupt airlinesservices are unique and cannot be substituted by other airlines. In addition, airlines
have incentive for capacity-building for several reasons. Since network size and ight frequencies are the
qualities that consumers value, the economies of scale may give airlines additional reasons to expand.
The airplanes, gates, and time slots are xed at least in the short term, which creates an option value of
holding on to those resources. Those resources remain even after the owner airline disappears and other
airlines will be willing to take the ownership of them. Also, capacity can be used as a strategic device to
deter entry. The incentives for capacity-building are not restricted to bankrupt airlines. Therefore, it is
not likely that the overcapacity problem, if it exists, will be solved after some airlines are gone as others
will enter or expand to ll the slack.
Our empirical results show that bankrupt airlines, even when not liquidated, start to cut back on
capacity near bankruptcy, either by withdrawing services from routes altogether or by reducing seat
supplies (with smaller airplanes or less frequent ight schedules). LCCs expand capacity while their
rivals, especially legacy airlines, are in bankruptcy. As a result, the route total capacity does not seem to
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change in the long term.
The ndings on capacity have two implications, one on the allocative e¢ ciency in production and
the other on LCC growth. First, if the total route capacity level remains una¤ected but rivals replace
bankrupt airlinescapacity, the composition of capacity will change. In this case, who would replace the
capacity is an interesting question. If replacing airlines are relatively more e¢ cient than bankrupt airlines,
then allocative e¢ ciency in production will improve as market shares change in favor of more e¢ cient
rms. The replacement pattern would depend on the substitutability with bankrupt airlinesproducts
and rivalsability to add capacity at low costs. Under the competition with di¤erentiated products, the
closest competitors will benet most from bankrupt airlinescapacity cutback. If competition is more
about price than product di¤erentiation, on the other hand, the most e¢ cient competitors with low cost
structures are more likely to benet. Our empirical results show that LCC expansion is prominent when
their bankrupt rivals, especially legacy ones reduce capacity, suggesting that allocative e¢ ciency of the
industry improves.
Second, the empirical results indicate that LCCs can be substitutes for bankrupt airlines and, more-
over, they are willing to and able to expand. This raises a question: what has been holding LCCs back
from expanding faster and more extensively? In other words, what would be the factor that spurs LCC
growth? Figure 16 shows the unit cost (excluding fuel cost7) di¤erential between carrier groups. The unit
cost level of LCCs is about 50-70% of that of legacy airlines. If fuel cost is included, the cost di¤erential
will be even larger.
Even with signicant cost advantages over legacy airlines, LCCs have recorded a slower and more
limited growth than expected given the long history of airline industry deregulation since 1978. In
general, market shares are sticky and market dominance is persistent. The airline industry was not an
exception. Until recently, LCC expansion has been focused on niche markets and demands that have not
been served by incumbent airlines and on less popular, secondary airports. That is, LCC growth has
occurred primarily in a limited range.
Why have LCCs not expanded that quickly or extensively? The reasons can be product di¤erentiation
or the existence of barriers to expansion. If travelers regard legacy carriersservices as superior to LCCs
(due to, for example, preference for extensive networks, more frequent ights, or other extra services),
then LCCs would not have been able to take large markets away from legacy carriers. This paper is
related to the branch of literatures on entry barriers. Switching costs from the Frequent Flyer Program
(FFP) can act as an articial entry barrier as in Farrell and Klemperer (2004). Goolsbee and Syverson
(2004) nd the evidence consistent with incumbentsincentives to cut fares and build consumer loyalty
when Southwest entry gets more likely. Moreover, the resources essential for airline operations (such as
airport gates and time slots) are xed at least in the short term. Long-term contracts on the use of the
resources can be a factor that limits LCC growth as in Aghion and Bolton (1987). Therefore, it would be
hard to get access to the facility if incumbents do not give up their shares locked in long-term contracts.
The ndings that LCCs replace bankrupt legacy airlinescapacities suggest that the obstacle for the
growth is more likely to be the existence of barriers, that is, market frictions. Lower cost alone does not
6Source: Authors calculation based on the Airline Data Project established by the MIT Global Airline Industry Program
7Di¤erences in CASM excluding fuel costs between carrier groups are compared because fuel costs may be a¤ected more
by external shocks than by endogenous managerial or operational e¢ ciencies.
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Figure 1: CASM (cost per available seat mile) Excluding Fuel Costs
guarantee that entrants will take markets from less e¢ cient incumbents. Incumbentsdiscrete capacity
cutback driven by bankruptcy or near-bankruptcy nancial distresses can present immediate growth op-
portunities for those e¢ cient airlines. For example, when a bankrupt legacy carrier reduces operations,
some of the usual customers to the carrier will have to choose other airline. For those customers, other
legacy carriers and LCCs may be thought of as providing homogeneous products. LCCs then face compe-
tition without switching costs. In this case, LCCs will be able to capture many those customers with low
fares. Also, new physical resources may become available for LCCs to use as bankrupt airlines give up
those resources. The fraction of LCC growth spurred by rivalsbankruptcy will be estimated in Section
1.7. The magnitude of the fraction will inform us about how high the barriers are in the airline industry.
3 Data
3.1 Data Sources and Sample Construction
There are two main data sources used in the analysis: the Airline Origin and Destination Survey Data
Bank 1B (DB1B) and the Air Carrier Statistics database (T-100 data bank). Both are available from
the Bureau of Transportation Statistics of the U.S. Department of Transportation.8 First, the Airline
Origin and Destination Survey DB1B is a 10% (random) sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers
collected by the O¢ ce of Airline Information of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. The quarterly
data set includes origin, destination and other itinerary details such as ticket price, number of passengers
transported, ticketing carrier, operating carrier, distance of the itinerary, number of connections (number
of coupons used in a itinerary), whether the ticket is for a round trip, etc.9
8http://www.transtats.bts.gov/
9The data is recorded when a ticket is used, but not when it is purchased. As travelers plan their trip ahead and book
tickets, there may be a time lag between the changes in an airlines competitive behavior and the market outcome. However,
since the data set is quarterly, if most people buy tickets within one or two months ahead of the time of actual ight, this
may not be a big problem.
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Second, we restrict our attention to U.S. domestic passenger airlines10 and domestic markets, and so
we use T-100 Domestic Market (U.S. Carriers) and T-100 Domestic Segment (U.S. Carriers) data from
the Air Carrier Statistics database. The market data includes monthly air carrier passenger tra¢ c
information by enplanement for operating carrier-origin-destination combination each time period. The
marketdata records the passengers that enplane and deplane between two specic points, regardless of
the number of connections between the two points in the itinerary. This market denition is comparable
to the origin and destination pair in DB1B. On the other hand, the segmentdata contains the number
of seats available, the number of scheduled departures, and departures performed, by operating carrier,
origin, and destination. Unlike in the marketdata, the segmentis composed of a pair of points served
or scheduled by a single stage.11
A route is dened as a pair of origin and destination (on an airport basis), and each route is regarded
as a market. A route is treated in a direction-manner in the sense that, if origin and destination airports
are switched, it is considered to be a di¤erent route. Direction matters because demand conditions can
be di¤erent even between the same two endpoints, depending on which way passengers are heading.12
Using the T-1000 Domestic Market database, we pick the 1000 most popular routes in each quarter from
1998:Q1 through 2008:Q2 in terms of passenger enplanements. The 1000 routes represent a signicant
portion of airline market demand. For instance, in 2007, the number of passengers who travelled the
1000 most popular routes is about 60% of the total demand. In addition, we pick the quarterly 200 most
popular airports (in terms of the number of passengers ying out of the airport) in the same way. The
200 airports cover over 99% of the total number of originating passengers.
We mainly rely on the route samplethat includes the quarterly 1000 most travelled routes for forty
two quarters from 1998:Q1 through 2008:Q2 as a route represents a market (in which airlines directly
compete) better than an airport. The airport samplewhich covers the 200 most popular airports will
also be used to conrm and supplement the ndings from the main route sample. The route sample will
inform us about the change in market competition. The airport sample, on the other hand, will better
represent the xed resources that are allocated between airlines. The route sample includes fare, capacity,
market share, and so on, while the airport sample does not include fare data. Capacity is mostly measured
by the number of available seats, but scheduled departures (number of ights) and available seat miles
(ASM) will also be used as other capacity measures.
10Airlines used in the study are the scheduled passenger airlines. Thus, charter, freight and taxi airlines are excluded.
11For example, if Southwest operates only connecting ights from San Francisco airport (SFO) to Chicago Midway airport
(MDW), the ights will be recorded in DB1B and the marketdata, but not in the segmentdata.
12For example, when Super Bowl is held in Tampa, Florida, demand levels for tickets going to and coming from Tampa
may be di¤erent.
8
Table 1.1: Airline List by Carrier Group
Carrier group Carrier Name Code Status*
American Airlines AA
Continental Airlines CO
Delta Airlines DL Reemerged from bankruptcy
Legacy Northwest Airlines NW Reemerged from bankruptcy
United Airlines UA Reemerged from bankruptcy
US Airways US Reemerged from bankruptcy twice
Alaska Airlines AS
Trans World Airlines TW Bankrupt then acquired by American
Southwest Airlines WN
ATA Airlines TZ Reemerged but liquidated later
JetBlue Airways B6
Low Cost AirTran Airways FL
Frontier Airlines F9 Under Ch 11
Spirit Airlines NK
American West Airlines HP Merged with US
Midway Airlines JI Liquidated
Others Midwest YX
Hawaiian Airlines HA Reemerged from bankruptcy
* Status change from 1998 to 2008
As for local economic conditions, we include employment, personal income, and population. Supple-
mental data on local economic conditions comes from the Regional Economic Accounts at the Bureau of
Economic Analysis.13 The data set, however, is rather limited. First, the data set covers only Metropol-
itan Statistical Areas (MSA) on a yearly basis up to 2007. So, it does not include Puerto Rico, Virgin
Islands, and some cities in Hawaii and Alaska in the main sample. For about 96% of the main sample,
both of the two endpoints of a route are MSAs. Due to less frequency and coverage of the data compared
to the main sample, we report the estimation results both with and without local economic conditions.
The observation unit in DB1B is itinerary level. We aggregate the observations to carrier level using
the number of passengers as a weight. As a result, in the nal sample, we have one observation for a
(ticket) carrier14 on a route (or at an airport) in a given time (year, quarter). In the analysis on the
total route capacity, itinerary level observations are aggregated to the route level so that we have one
observation for a route in a given time. Again, observations are weighted by the number of passengers.
13http://www.bea.gov/regional/reis/default.cfm?selTable=CA1-3&section=2
14A ticket carrier is the airline that sold a ticket for an itinerary while an operating carrier is the airline that operated the
ight. A ticket carrier and an operating carrier can be di¤erent for the same itinerary. We choose a ticket carrier over an
operating carrier because the ticket carrier sets fares.
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In addition, we drop observations if a carrier has less than 1% of the passengers on a route (or less
than 1% of the capacity at an airport) in a given time, the (one-way) fare is less than 20 dollars, or an
itinerary involves more than 4 connections in a one-way trip or more than 8 connections in a round trip.
All fares used in analysis are ination adjusted in 2000 dollars.15 Table 1.1 is the list of main airlines in
the nal data set by carrier group. These eighteen carriers account for about 98% of the sample.16
We treat the airlines with di¤erent codes as separate carriers. So, a subsidiary of a large airline will
be regarded as a separate airline. This is not much relevant especially in the route sample, because those
subsidiaries usually operate on small, less populated routes that are not included in our main sample.
Also, American West (HP) and US Airways (US) spent over a year after their merger announcement
before they began using the same code. During the period between the announcement and the actual
merger, the two airlines are treated separately.17
To identify bankruptcy events, we rely on the Lynn M. LoPuckis Bankruptcy Research Database
(BRD)18 and the U.S. Airline Bankruptcies & Service Cessations listed on the Air Transportation
Association (ATA) website.19 The BRD contains Chapter 11 lings of public companies with assets over
$100 million that are required to le a form 10-K with SEC. The list of bankruptcy lings on ATA web
page includes both Chapters 7 and 11, regardless of the size of a bankrupt airline. However, it says the
list is loose, uno¢ cial. When the dates of bankruptcy ling, reemergence, or service cessation do not
match between the two sources, we searched for online news articles on a specic bankruptcy event and
picked the more accurate one. From these sources, we construct the history of airline bankruptcies during
the data period.
Table 1.2 shows all bankruptcy events that we cover in the analysis. There are twenty one bankruptcy
lings in the sample. Among those lings, bankrupt airlines survived in ten cases, went out of business
after bankruptcy protection in nine cases, and ceased operations immediately in two cases. It is noteworthy
that all six legacy airline bankruptcies are Chapter 11 lings and only one of the bankrupt legacy airlines
has been liquidated.20
15Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers is available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymos.
16For the list of LCCs, refer to Darin Lees webpage (http://www.darinlee.net/data/lccshare.html).




20Trans World Airlines (TW) led for bankruptcy protection for three times and ended up with liquidation at the nal
attempt.
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Table 1.2: Airline Bankruptcy Filings (1998 through 2008)
Date of Date of Date of
Carrier Name Filing Ch. Reemergence Service Cessation
Kiwi International (KP) Mar 23, 1999 11 Dec 8, 1999
Eastwind Airlines (W9) Sep 30, 1999 7
Tower Air (FF) Feb 29, 2000 11 Dec 7, 2000
Pro Air (P9) Sep 19, 2000 11 Sep 19, 2000
National Airlines (N7) Dec 6, 2000 11 Nov 6, 2002
Midway Airlines (JI) Aug 14, 2001 11 Oct 30, 2003
Trans World Airlines (TW)* Jan 10, 2001 11 Dec 1, 2001
Sun Country Airlines (SY)** Jan 8, 2002 7 April 15, 2002
Vanguard Airlines (NJ) July 30, 2002 11 Dec 19, 2004
United Airlines (UA) Dec 9, 2002 11 Feb 2, 2006
US Airways (US) 1st Aug 11, 2002 11 Mar 31, 2003
Hawaiian Airlines (HA) Mar 21, 2003 11 June 2, 2005
ATA Airlines (TZ) 1st Oct 26, 2004 11 Feb 28, 2006
US Airways (US) 2nd Sep 12, 2004 11 Sep 27, 2005
Aloha Airlines (AQ) 1st Dec 30, 2004 11 Feb 17, 2006
Delta Airlines (DL) Sep 14, 2005 11 April 25, 2007
Northwest Airlines (NW) Sep 14, 2005 11 May 18, 2007
Independence Air (DH) Nov 7, 2005 11 Jan 5, 2006
Aloha Airlines (AQ) 2nd Mar 31, 2008 7
ATA Airlines (TZ) 2nd April 3, 2008 11 April 3, 2008
Frontier Airlines (F9) April 10, 2008 11
* Trans World is merged by American,
** Sun Countrys bankruptcy procedure was converted from Ch.7 to Ch.11
3.2 Summary Statistics
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show summary statistics for the route sample (quarterly 1000 most popular routes) and
the airport sample (quarterly 200 most popular airports), respectively. Denitions of the variables are in
Table 1.6 in Section 1.5.1 In the tables, the rst column is for the entire sample, and the other columns
compare the data in normal times (columns labeled as Normal) and during bankruptcy (columns
labeled as DuringB) for bankrupt airlines. Bankrupt airlines are divided into two groups depending
on whether the bankrupt airline is a legacy carrier or not. By normal times, we mean one year (four
quarters) prior to bankruptcy ling or before (that is, the periods before a¤ected by bankruptcy). In
other words, we exclude the observations during the period from three quarters prior to bankruptcy ling
to the end of sampling period. Note that the data on capacity is available only for direct ights and thus
the sample size (N_sgmt) is smaller for the capacity variables (N_seats, N_flights, and Seat_share).
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Also, including local economic conditions (Emp_origin, ..., Pop_dest) lead to a smaller sample size
(N_local) as they are restricted to MSAs until 2007:Q4.
Table 1.3 shows that bankrupt legacy airlines (Legacy) tend to have lower fares and capacity lev-
els during bankruptcy as compared to in the normal times. They also have smaller market presence
(Mkt_share and Seat_share) during bankruptcy than normal. It is noteworthy that the fraction of
routes exposed to the competition from LCCs such as Southwest is higher during bankruptcy than before
(see LCCin and SWin). On the other hand, bankrupt non-legacy airlines (Other; usually a LCC or a
regional carrier) tend to have lower fares but more capacities. We can see that the airport sample shows
the same pattern (see Table 1.4). Although the comparison of summary statistics between the normal
times and the periods during bankruptcy can be informative, we need a more rigorous empirical analysis
to disentangle various confounding factors, which we will discuss in the next section.
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics - Route Sample
Panel 1: Carrier-level observations
Bankrupt Airlines
Legacy Other
Variable All Normal DuringB Normal DuringB
N_seats 64.819 72.437 64.430 50.661 59.900
[unit:1000 seats] (50.100) (54.157) (47.015) (55.676) (51.666)
N_flights 456.715 473.553 435.865 370.425 405.502
[1 departure] (372.65) (337.216) (296.353) (460.852) (426.345)
Med_fare 131.74 143.55 128.85 137.81 123.93
[2000$] (50.78) (59.63) (41.92) (48.28) (43.12)
Q1_fare 102.24 107.44 99.05 114.00 106.25
[2000$] (35.10) (37.91) (28.82) (36.81) (37.37)
Q3_fare 192.46 224.24 184.59 176.66 152.73
[2000$] (98.09) (121.03) (76.02) (65.56) (52.17)
Mkt_share .228 .215 .189 .156 .172
[1] (.270) (.273) (.245) (.167) (.187)
Seat_share .476 .539 .495 .290 .330
[1] (.309) (.321) (.290) (.202) (.223)
LCCin .718 .591 .693 .929 .884
(.194) (.491) (.461) (.255) (.319)
SWin .258 .165 .218 .174 .216
(.437) (.371) (.413) (.379) (.412)
Network .443 .556 .542 .093 .069
[1/1000] (.194) (.135) (.125) (.046) (.048)
Direct .509 .447 .451 .495 .528
[1] (.418) (.397) (.403) (.456) (.446)
N 182,437 49,006 21,307 7,916 1,352
N_sgmt 82,333 19,690 7,767 3,386 609
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. N : sample size
N_sgmt : nonstop-ight-only sample size (capacity data only available for the segment sample)
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Panel 2: Route-level observations
Variable Mean Variable Mean Variable Mean
(SD) (SD) (SD)
N_seats_all 134.010 Distance 853.28 Inc_dest 171.72
[unit:1000 seats] (77.146) [1 mile] (608.98) [106 2000$] (169.24)
N_flights_all 1120.873 Emp_origin 2440.93 Pop_origin 4893.09
[1 departure] (640) [1000] (2047.31) [1000] (4394.42)
LCCin .660 Emp_dest 2441.33 Pop_dest 4893.02
(.473) [1000] (2042.23) [1000] (4382.51)
SWin .287 Inc_origin 171.78
(.452) [106 2000$] (169.74)
N_sgmt 41,993 N_local 38,678
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
N_sgmt: nonstop ight only sample size (capacity data only available for the segment sample)
N_local: size of the sample with local economic conditions (98:Q1-07:Q4, MSA only)
Table 1.4: Summary Statistics - Airport Sample
Bankrupt Airlines
Legacy Other
Variable All Normal DuringB Normal DuringB
N_seats .148 .228 .202 .103 .126
[unit:106] (.447) (.691) (.578) (.200) (.200)
ASM 1.190 1.874 1.954 .726 1.140
[106 seat mile] (3.949) (5.613) (5.454) (1.577) (1.805)
N_flights 1.339 1.590 1.408 .941 .865
[1 departure] (3.509) (4.606) (3.952) (1.943) (1.476)
Mkt_share .134 .173 .107 .111 .134
[1] (.170) (.194) (.127) (.184) (.206)
Seat_share .133 .173 .107 .110 .134
[1] (.169) (.193) (.129) (.183) (.203)
LCCin .806 .767 .887 .932 .883
(.394) (.422) (.315) (.250) (.321)
SWin .432 .430 .517 .428 .444
(.495) (.495) (.499) (.494) (.497)
Emp 1239.94 1351.77 1514.40 1517.36 2491.91
[1000] (1847.01) (1861.85) (1895.20) (1971.38) 2520.95)
Inc 93.56 91.96 122.50 110.05 202.59
[106 2000$] (162.60) (148.15) (178.70) (160.17) (226.32)
Pop 2498.24 2694.66 3060.58 3030.79 5113.9
[1000] (3911.91) (3923.64) (4046.29) (4179.01) (5429.80)
N_sgmt 59,359 9,448 3,470 2,136 344
N_local 51,950 8,785 3,171 1,879 230
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses, N_sgmt: sample size
N_local: size of the sample with local economic conditions (98:Q1-07:Q4, MSA only)
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4 Conceptual Framework and Identication
This section outlines a conceptual framework of the paper, raises identication issues, and discusses how
to deal with those issues. We are interested in evaluating the e¤ects of bankruptcy on airlines. The central
questions are, rst, how bankrupt airlines change fares and capacities (i.e. e¤ect of own bankruptcy),
second, how bankrupt airlinesrivals change fares and capacities in response (i.e. e¤ect of the exposure
to rivalsbankruptcy) and, lastly, how the total route capacity level changes (or does not change) as a
result.
We depend on the concept of average treatment e¤ect on the treated to describe a conceptual
framework of empirical analysis. We begin by dening the potential outcomes with and without bank-
ruptcy. In fare and capacity analysis for bankrupt airlines and their rivals, an individual is dened as
a carrier-route-time combination labeled with irt and the outcome of interest is fare or capacity set by
a carrier i on route r at time t (Yirt). Airlines can be involved in bankruptcy in two ways: they le
for bankruptcy themselves or they compete with bankrupt airlines. There are two potential outcomes
depending on whether an airline is bankrupt or not (bankrupt-carrier indicator: Dit = 1 if a carrier i
is bankrupt at time t and 0 otherwise). Also, there are two potential outcomes depending on whether
an airline is a rival to bankrupt airlines or not (bankruptcy indicator: Wrt = 1 if bankrupt airlines are
serving route r at time t and 0 otherwise). Bshrrt is the normalmarket presence of bankrupt airlines
on route r at time t, that is, how dominant the bankrupt airlines used to be on the route. For rivals,
we include Bshrrt to allow for the e¤ect to vary depending on the degree of exposure to bankruptcies.
For instance, when an airline used to be dominant on a route, its bankruptcy may have larger e¤ects on
the rivals competing on the route. We want to estimate the relative di¤erence between the actual and
counterfactual fare or capacity levels. To be more specic, we are interested in identifying the relative






j Dit = 1

= E[log Yirt(Dit = 1)  log Yirt(Dit = 0) j Dit = 1]






j Wrt = 1; Bshrrt = b

= E[log Yirt(Wrt = 1)  log Yirt(Wrt = 0) j Wrt = 1; Bshrrt = b]
for the rivals competing against the bankrupt airlines.
As the log di¤erence is approximately the same as the percentage change, Bankrupt is interpreted as
the percentage change in Y from own bankruptcy and Rival is regarded as the percentage change in Y
from rivalsbankruptcy. The rationale for choosing relative change over absolute change is that fare or
capacity levels will be di¤erent on di¤erent routes, and we expect the bankrupt airlines to change fares
and capacities proportionally to the usual levels on each route rather than by the same amount on every
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route.21
Ideally, we want to measure fare and capacity with and without bankruptcies for an identical unit,
that is, for the same airline on the same route at the same time period. If we can observe the same
individual with and without bankruptcy, we can simply compare the two outcomes (fare or capacity)
with and without bankruptcy to see the bankruptcy e¤ect. For example, a di¤erence between the (log)
fare/capacity averages with and without bankruptcy will represent the bankruptcy e¤ect. Unfortunately,
we can observe only what has been realized and we do not have data on potential outcomes unrealized.
That is, we either observe fare/capacity of airline i on route r at time t with bankruptcy or without
bankruptcy. This is where the unconfoundedness assumption plays a part. Unconfoundedness can be
expressed as
Dit jj Yirt(Dit = 1); Yirt(Dit = 0) jXirt
Wrt jj Yirt(Wirt = 1); Yirt(Wirt = 0) jXirt
where Xirt is a set of covariates that can a¤ect the outcomes, fare or capacity. The condition means
that own bankruptcy (Dit = 1) and rivals bankruptcies (Wirt = 1) are randomly assigned given the
observables, Xirt. In other words, given Xirt, the bankrupt carrier indicator and the bankruptcy indicator
are exogenous and there are no confounding factors that are associated with both Y (fare and capacity)
and the bankrupt-carrier and bankruptcy indicators, Dit and Wrt. This enables us to identify Bankrupt
and Rival. The validity of the unconfoundedness assumption will depend on how e¤ectively we can
control for potential endogeneity. To assure unconfoundedness, we exploit the panel structure of the data
set by employing a xed e¤ects model. In this way, time-invariant individual e¤ects will be accounted for.
If endogeneity and selection bias are restricted to time-invariant components, conditioning on individual
xed e¤ects will be su¢ cient for the condition to hold. Otherwise, we will need to control for other
time-variant factors responsible for endogeneity and selection bias, which will be discussed later in this
section.
Under the unconfoundedness assumption, we can rewrite the bankruptcy e¤ects as follows:
Bankrupt = E [E[log YirtjDit = 1; Xirt]  E[log YirtjDit = 0; Xirt]]
Rival(b) = E [E[log YirtjWrt = 1; Bshrrt = b;Xirt]  E[log YirtjWrt = 0; Xirt]]
where the outer expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of Xirt.
To model fare and capacity for parametric estimation, we assume that (1) the percentage change
in fares and capacities set by bankrupt airlines are homogeneous on all routes where those airlines are
serving, (2) the percentage change in fares and capacities set by bankrupt airlinesrivals are proportional
to the degree of bankrupt airlinesmarket presence/dominance on a route, (3) the e¤ects of covariates in
Xirt on Yirt are the same regardless of bankruptcy, and (4) the log-transformed outcome log Yirt can be
21Though not reported here, the same analysis has been done to estimate absolute change instead of relative change and
the results are not di¤erent qualitatively.
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expressed as a linear function. Then, we have
log Yirt = 0 + 1Dit + 2WirtBshrrt +Xirt + "irt
where f0, 1, 2, g is a set of parameters to be estimated and "irt is a random error with mean zero
conditional on RHS variables. Then, the estimands of interest are simplied to
Bankrupt = 1
Rival(b) = 2b
which can be estimated consistently by regressing log Yirt on 1, Dit, and WirtBshrrt.








j Wrt = 1; Bshrrt = b

= E[log(Yrt(Wrt = 1))  log(Yrt(Wrt = 0)) j Wrt = 1; Bshrrt = b]
for the total route capacity, where Yrt is the total route capacity on route r at time t and Wrt and Bshrrt
are the same as dened as before. We will refer to the routes that bankruptcy-ling airlines are serving
as bankruptcyroutes. We are interested in how the total route capacity changes (or does not change)
over the course of bankruptcy. As in the model for carrier-level fare and capacity, we assume that the
percentage change in the total route capacity on bankruptcy routes is proportional to the degree of
bankrupt airlinespresence on the route and model the log-transformed value of total route capacity as a
linear equation accordingly:
log Yrt = 0 + 1WirtBshrrt + Zrt0 + "rt
where Zrt is a set of route characteristics that may be associated with the total route capacity and
bankruptcy of a carrier serving on route r (to assure the validity of the uncounfoundedness assumption),
f0, 1, 0, 1g is a set of parameters to be estimated, and "rt is a random error with mean zero
conditional on RHS variables. Combined with the unconfoundedness assumption (Wrt jj Yrt(Wirt =
1); Yrt(Wirt = 0))jZrt), the model enables us to identify the change in the total route capacity with and
without bankruptcy, i.e.
Route(b) = 1b
by regressing log Yrt on 1, WirtBshrrt, and Zrt.
In addition, we look at the exit of bankrupt airlines from a route to see how the exit a¤ects rivals.
Our empirical results and anecdotal evidence suggest that bankrupt airlines shrink operations either by
reducing capacity on a route or by withdrawing services from a route altogether. The exit event will give
us the opportunity to expect what would have happened if a bankrupt airline is liquidated instead of
entering Chapter 11 protection. The e¤ect of bankrupt airlinesexit from a route can be expressed in the
same way as the bankruptcy e¤ects are represented above. The exit events are not a random experiment
of liquidation e¤ect on rivals because a bankrupt airline made the decision to withdraw from the market
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or creditors found the airline unprotable to keep operating. However, it will inform us of what actually
happens when a bankrupt airline is gone (at least temporarily), supplementing the evidence from the
comparison between actual and counterfactual behaviors of airlines a¤ected by bankruptcies.
So far, we did not divide bankrupt airlines and rivals depending on which carrier group they belong
to for a simple presentation of the identication problem. In the empirical analysis, we will separate
the bankruptcy lings depending on whether a bankrupt airline is a legacy carrier or not. We will then
divide bankrupt airlinesrivals depending on whether the rival is a LCC or not. Moreover, we allow for
the bankruptcy e¤ects to vary over the course of bankruptcy by estimating the changes in each event
period separately (starting from pre-bankruptcy periods near bankruptcy to post-bankruptcy periods
after reemergence, if applicable, from bankruptcy). This division of bankruptcy cases and periods does
not change the implications of the identication problems and models stated above. The specic variable
constructions are detailed in Section 1.5.1, and the empirical specications are presented in Section 1.5.2.
A su¢ cient number of observations una¤ected by bankruptcy will allow us to estimate the counter-
factual patterns of fare and capacity set by airlines. The data for estimating the counterfactuals are from
two sources: the data from the periods una¤ected by bankruptcy (prior to bankruptcy) and the data
from routes where no airline is bankrupt. For bankrupt airlines, we compare fare and capacity set by the
physically identical carriers at di¤erent times (one before and the other after a¤ected by bankruptcy).
For their rivals, the comparison will be done for identical carriers both over time and cross-sectionally
(between the routes where some rivals are bankrupt and those where no airline is bankrupt). We have at
least ve quarters ahead of every bankruptcy ling, and we have more than two years ahead of bankruptcy
lings for most bankruptcy lings. Among the quarterly 1000 most popular routes used in the analysis, at
least some routes are not a¤ected by bankruptcy (and this is true for the quarterly 200 popular airports
used for supplementary analysis).
We adopt the event study approach for empirical analysis. The basic idea is that we compare fare
or capacity for bankruptcy-a¤ected airlines and routes (bankrupt airlines, their rivals, and bankruptcy
routes) to the normal counterparts una¤ected by bankruptcy. The normal counterparts refer to the
counterfactuals absent bankruptcy events. The key to the identication is unbiased estimation of the
counterfactuals in absence of bankruptcies. As stated previously, we add individual xed e¤ects, consid-
ering that time-invariant individual heterogeneity may be responsible for potential endogeneity.
Now, we will discuss ve issues that may lead to potential biases in estimating counterfactuals absent
bankruptcies due to time-variant factors, and the best available options to lessen the potential biases
one by one. First, as bankruptcy ling airlines will begin to experience nancial distress at some point
prior to actual bankruptcy ling, this may alter the airlinesbehavior even prior to the actual bankruptcy
ling. Kennedy (2000) examined the operating performance of bankruptcy ling rms and their rivals
and found that the majority of declines in performance of bankrupt rms and their competitors occur in
the periods close to the ling or in the early stage of bankruptcy. So, treating pre-bankruptcy periods as
normal times may bias the estimates of bankruptcy e¤ects downwards. In this case, separate estimation of
pre-bankruptcy periods will solve the problem. Thus, we track bankrupt airlines and their rivals starting
three quarters prior to the actual bankruptcy ling.
E¤ects in post-bankruptcy periods will also be treated separately to see whether bankruptcy has a
17
temporary or permanent e¤ect on airlines and the industry. The signicance and size of estimates on
fare and capacity change in post-bankruptcy periods will show us whether the e¤ect, if any, is persistent.
Bankrupt airlines may go back to their original strategies from the time before they su¤ered from nancial
distress. On the other hand, bankrupt airlines may continue to keep their bankruptcy-period strategies
even after they reemerge. There is also the possibility that the airlines become even stronger threats
to rivals once they exit bankruptcy with lower debt and cost levels, engaging in aggressive strategies to
win some market share lost in bankruptcy. If bankrupt airlinesbehavior can change in post-bankruptcy
periods, not considering those possibilities will bias the estimates on bankruptcy e¤ects.
Second, it is noteworthy that bankruptcies often coincide with deteriorated demand conditions. The
trend in demand, if it exists, matters as it may complicate the problem due to the fact that the total route
capacity will decline with diminishing popularity of travelling the route and the decreasing demand may
push some airlines to le for bankruptcy. The change in demand may result in a false causal relationship
between bankruptcy and the total route capacity level. Dealing with the endogeneity, however, depends
on our view of whether the endogeneity is local or not. Ciliberto and Schenone (2008) argued that since
airlines serving routes with diminishing demand may be more likely to le for bankruptcy, the downward
demand trend can complicate the estimated fare/capacity change upon bankruptcy to be biased in a
negative direction. As a measure to lessen the bias, they include origin and destination specic linear
time trends in their econometric models (on fare, number of available seats, or load factor). If there is a
positive relationship between bankruptcy and the diminishing time trend of demand, removing the linear
time trend will be appropriate. However, removing the origin and destination specic linear time trend
could be problematic for several reasons.
The demand or supply shocks pushing airlines to le for bankruptcy are more likely to be economy-
wide rather than market-specic. That is, airlines, especially big ones, will not be forced to le for
bankruptcy just because demand is decreasing on some routes that they serve. Also, bankrupt airlines
cannot choose to be bankrupt on some unprotable routes where demand is in downward trend. Thus,
it can be misleading to conclude that bankruptcy routes are more likely to have been su¤ering from
diminishing demand. In addition, if the decline in demand is severe and expected to continue on some
routes, then airlines will adjust their route structures by moving out of declining routes and entering into
ourishing routes. That is, airlines will not stay in declining routes to le for bankruptcy.
Moreover, an important question when it comes to including the time trends is whether there actually
are specic linear time trends on bankruptcyroutes in the rst place. If we look at some routes where
a dominant carrier is bankrupt, it is hard to say that demand is declining on those routes as compared
to other routes. If there is no specic demand time trend before any of the airlines serving the route
les for bankruptcy and we include a linear time trend variable to control for the nonexistent trend,
then the estimated trendwill be picking up all the bankruptcy-related e¤ects, and we will have biased
estimates. For example, if fare or capacity is cut even prior to bankruptcy ling and the cut continues
over the bankruptcy proceedings, then the linear time trend variable will pick up this negative e¤ect of
bankruptcy on fare or capacity level, and the estimated bankruptcy e¤ect will be biased upward. The
bias from including nonexistent linear time trends has been explored by Wolfers (2006) on the e¤ect
of unilateral divorce laws on divorce rates. In this study, instead of including market-specic linear
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time trends, time-specic dummy variables will be used to take account of economic shocks common to
airlines and routes, and the e¤ects of local economic conditions will be controlled for by personal income,
employment conditions, and population for origin and destination.
Third, a source of potential bias comes also from the possible pre-existing trend of growth of LCCs
or decline of legacy carriers. Since the deregulation, LCCs have grown slowly but steadily. In this case,
the LCC expansion in the periods surrounding rivalsbankruptcy may be a mere ratication of the pre-
existing trend that would have continued even without bankruptcy. In fact, the increasing presence of
LCCs may have even pushed other airlines further into bankruptcy. In that case, legacy airlines would
have been experiencing reduction in operations, which might have triggered bankruptcy lings. If the
pre-existing trends are not controlled for, it will lead to overestimation of bankruptcy e¤ects on capacity
setting.
We include carrier-specic linear time trends in addition to pre- and post-bankruptcy periods to
account for systematic patterns in fare and capacity set by each carrier. To disentangle pre-existing
growth trends from bankruptcy e¤ects, it would be ideal to know the individual airlines growth plan
and how it has been changed upon rivals bankruptcy. Without knowledge of this, however, the best
assumption would be that the pre-existing trend would have continued, were it not for rivalsbankruptcy.
Including pre- and post-bankruptcy periods will control, at least partially, for the trend that may exist
on a route a¤ected by bankruptcy. In their research on the impact of workers job losses on earnings,
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1992) added a set of worker-specic linear time trends to take account
of individual-specic rates of earnings growth. With su¢ cient observations for the time before being
a¤ected by bankruptcy, we can estimate the pre-existing growth trend of each carrier, if any. If we
include carrier-specic linear time trends, the estimates of bankruptcy e¤ect on rivals will capture the
rivals capacity growth (or decline) as compared to the normal periods prior to bankruptcy as well as
other routes una¤ected by bankruptcy.
However, caution is needed here, as in the inclusion of market-specic time trends. Without such
pre-existing trends, the inclusion of individual-carrier-specic time trends may pick up the bankruptcy
e¤ects, leading to underestimation. This can be more serious for bankrupt airlines than for their rivals
because a large part of change in fare and capacity in bankruptcy can be taken out as a trend. So, we
take the estimates with carrier-specic time trends as our conservative estimates for bankruptcy e¤ects.
Fourth, di¤erent carrier groups may be a¤ected di¤erently by even the same demand and supply
shocks. That is, relative attractiveness or relative e¢ ciency between carrier groups may change over time,
even after carrier-specic time trends are controlled for. The time-variant demand and supply conditions
may lead to a decline of one carrier group but an opportunity for other carrier group. For example, a
recession may be associated with a higher price-sensitivity of travelers, and hence LCCs may nd it easy
to attract passengers with low fares. Also, a spike in fuel costs may a¤ect legacy airlines more seriously
than LCCs. Since bankruptcies are often associated with recessions and fuel cost increases, this will lead
to an overestimation of LCC expansion during legacy rivalsbankruptcies. On the other hand, a sudden
decrease in demand may reduce congestion problems, which may a¤ect the value of connected ights
positively while the value of direct ights is left una¤ected. In this case, since legacy airlines tend to
adopt the hub-and-spoke system while LCCs tend to adopt the point-to-point system, the same negative
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demand shocks will a¤ect legacy and low-cost airlines di¤erently.
We add a set of time-specic dummy variables for each carrier group to account for the heterogeneous
e¤ects of the shocks in the same time period for di¤erent carrier groups: legacy, low-cost, and other
carriers. The inclusion of year-quarter e¤ects for each carrier group alleviates the potential bias from the
changes in relative attractiveness or relative e¢ ciency between carrier groups.
Fifth, there can be a selection bias. LCCsroute choices with limited resources upon rivalsbank-
ruptcy may bias the estimation. It may take some time for airlines to increase the stock of airplanes and
employees when they see the opportunity to expand. In this case, the airlines will instead reallocate the
limited resources to more promising routes or airports in the short term. For example, if the airlines nd
bankruptcy routes protable, then they will transfer their capacities from other routes to the bank-
ruptcyroutes, leading to overestimation of capacity expansion of rival airlines during rivalsbankruptcy.
The reverse can be true if bankruptcy hurts rivals. Here, the self-selection issue arises not because LCCs
are not identical on bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy routes but because the identical airline can
redistribute the constrained capacities between bankruptcyand non-bankruptcyroutes. That is, the
source of bias is the combination of the dependency between routes from the mobility of capacities and
the limited resources in the short-term.
However, the bias will become negligible in the long term. After all, the short-term xed total capacity
of an airline will become exible in the long term. So, the estimated bankruptcy e¤ects in the later period
of bankruptcy will become less vulnerable to the potential bias as an airline adjusts its total capacity level.
In addition, we conduct airport-level analysis as well as route-level analysis as they are complementary.
Airport-level analysis will be relatively free from the bias, because the transfer of capacities between
airports will be less active than that between routes.
Other time-variant confounding factors that may a¤ect fares and capacities are included. In particular,
we include the presence of LCCs, network size of a carrier, and the portion of direct ights. As we will see
later, bankruptcy of a carrier serving a route may entice LCCs to enter, and the entry of LCCs has been
reported to a¤ect fare levels negatively. Also, bankrupt airlines often shrink network sizes, which may
have negative impacts on fares as they cannot command premium for extensive networks. On the other
hand, we add the presence of LCCs that may confound capacity change from LCC entry with bankruptcy
e¤ects as the entry of LCCs is often linked to capacity increase as fares are lowered.
5 Empirical Model
5.1 Variable Construction
We build empirical models based on the conceptual framework from the previous section. We are interested
in how bankruptcy a¤ects airlines near, during, and after bankruptcy, and how the total capacity level
changes as a result. Thus, the bankruptcy-related variables are constructed in a manner so that we can
capture how a bankrupt rms and its competitorsbehaviors change over time in the periods surrounding
bankruptcy. Table 1.5 shows how the bankruptcy-related variables are constructed.
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Table 1.5: Variable List - Bankruptcy-Related Variables
Carrier Route































Superscript m = legacy if legacy bankruptcies, oth if others.
TB : Quarter of bankruptcy ling, TRE : Last quarter in bankruptcy
TEX : Quarter of a bankrupt airlines exit from a route
The event dates of interest include a series of quarters from three quarters prior to bankruptcy ling to
post-bankruptcy periods (if a bankrupt airline reemerged) or liquidation date (if a bankrupt airline ends up
being liquidated). The quarters before and after a bankrupt airline exits from a market during bankruptcy
procedures will also be considered to see whether outright liquidation will help rivals improve protability
by softening competition and removing excess capacity. To our knowledge, the exit of bankrupt airlines
from markets has not been covered in previous studies on airline bankruptcies. If (1) a bankrupt airline
disappeared from the route that it served at some point in a year prior to bankruptcy ling and then (2)
it does not show up in the data for at least for four consecutive quarters after they rst disappeared, then
we regard the event as a bankrupt airlines exit from the route. If liquidation of bankrupt airlines would
benet rivals by preventing bankrupt airlines from toughening competition and by eliminating excess
capacity, then we expect to nd the signs of improvement in rivalsprotability and reduction in the total
route capacity.
We divide bankruptcy lings into two groups based on which carrier group the ling airline belongs
to. If a bankrupt airline is a legacy carrier, we denote it as legacy bankruptcy. In other cases, the
bankruptcy is denoted as other bankruptcy. The same set of variables will be constructed for each
of the two groups, respectively. The study is more interested in legacy bankruptcies than others since,
rst, it informs us of the impact of large incumbent airlinesbankruptcies on their rivals and, second,
the bankruptcy will a¤ect a large number of routes so we have many observations to get more reliable
estimates on bankruptcy e¤ects as compared to other bankruptcies that involve smaller carriers so the
a¤ected markets and competitors are rather limited.
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The bankruptcyroutes and the rivalsto bankrupt carriers can be dened in two ways depending
on whether a bankrupt airline has direct ights on a route or not. A bankrupt airline can be present on a
route either by operating its own direct ights or by providing connected ights or marketing tickets with
other airlines through code-sharing. Our denition is based on whether a bankrupt airline is selling tickets
on a route. That is, we regard an airline as being present on a route if they sell the tickets for travelling
the route, even when the airline does not directly operate ights on the route. This denition emphasizes
the consumer perception about whether an airline serves a route. So, we allow for the possibility that
connected ights are good substitutes for direct ights. In addition, the denition based on whether to
provide direct ights can involve measurement error in identifying bankruptcy e¤ects since connected
ights can be a large portion of services especially for network carriers.
We regard a route as a bankruptcyroute if a bankrupt airlines market share is not less than 1%. The
competitors selling a ticket on the bankruptcyroute are considered rivalsto bankrupt carriers. Since
we consider the market share of bankrupt airlines (as will be explained later), the potential bankruptcy
e¤ect will depend on the degree of presence/dominance of bankrupt airlines on a route. The robustness
checks using the other denition, though not reported here, are not qualitatively di¤erent from the results
presented in this paper. This is because an airline is very likely to be providing direct services on a route
where its market share is signicant. In the airport sample, this is not an issue.
We construct bankruptcy-related dummy variables as an interaction between carrier identity (based
on whether bankrupt or not and whether a legacy carrier or not) and the indicator of time intervals (pre-,
during, post-bankruptcy periods, or pre- and post-exit periods). Bankruptcy indicators are a series of
dummy variables for a bankrupt carrier in each event quarter k from three quarters prior to the ling
through the carriers last quarter in the sample, as listed in the column labeled Bankrupt airlines in
Table 1.3, i.e. k 2 fTB 3, TB 2, TB 1, TB, TB+1, TB+2~TRE , TRE+1, TRE+2, TRE+3~; TEX  2,
TEX   1, TEX , TEX + 1, TEX + 2~g where TB is the quarter of bankruptcy ling, TRE is the last quarter
in bankruptcy before reemergence from bankruptcy if applicable, and TEX is the quarter of bankrupt
airlines exit from a route. D[k]lgit is a bankrupt-carrier indicator that takes one if t = k where t is
calendar quarter while k is event quarter. So, D[TB]
lg
it , for example, takes a value of one if an airline i is a
legacy carrier and it les for bankruptcy in the current quarter t. D[TRE + 1]othit is triggered if an airline
i is not a legacy carrier and it reemerged from bankruptcy in the previous quarter.
The bankruptcy indicators, fW [k]irtgk, are the counterparts of bankrupt-carrier indicators for each
event quarter k. W [k]irt takes a value of one if an airline i is competing with bankrupt airlines on route r at
t = k; that is, if there are bankrupt airlines serving route r at t = k. We then multiply the bankruptcy indi-
cators for the leads and lags of bankruptcy ling dates by the average market share of bankrupt airlines for
the previous year from four quarters prior to the bankrupt ling ( Bshr[B]rt = 14
PTB 4
t=TB 7Mkt_sharert
where TB is the quarter of bankruptcy ling and Mkt_sharert is the market share of bankrupt airlines
on route r at time t). Similarly, the bankruptcy indicators before and after a bankrupt airlines exit is
multiplied by the average market share of the bankrupt airline for the one year prior to four quarters
before the bankrupt airline exits the market ( Bshr[E]rt = 14
PTEX 4
t=TEX 7Mkt_sharert where TEX is the
quarter of bankrupt airlines exit from route r and Mkt_sharert is the same as before).
22
Table 1.6: Variable List - Other Variables
Variable Unit Description
Fare Med_fareirt 2000$ Median fare of irt
Q1_fareirt 2000$ 25% percentile fare of irt
Q3_fareirt 2000$ 75% percentile fare of irt
Capacity N_seatsirt 1,000 # available seats of irt
N_seats_allrt 1,000 # available seats of rt
N_flights_allrt 1,000 # scheduled departures of rt
ASMiat 1,000 seat mile Available seat miles of iat
Share Mkt_shareirt 1 Share of irt in terms of passenger enplanement
Seat_shareirt 1 Share of irt in terms of available seats
Route LCCinrt 1 if LCC serves rt, 0 otherwise
Characteristics SWinrt 1 if Southwest serves rt, 0 otherwise
Local Inc_originrt 106 2000$ Personal income in the origin city of rt
Economic Inc_destrt 106 2000$ Personal income in the destination city of rt
Conditions Pop_originrt 1,000 Population in the origin city of rt
Pop_destrt 1,000 Population in the destination city of rt
Emp_originrt 1,000 Total employment in the origin city of rt
Emp_destrt 1,000 Total employment in the destination city of rt
Incat 2000$ Personal income in the city of at
Popat 1,000 Population in the city of at
Empat 1,000 Total employment in the city of at
Other Carrier Networkit 1/1000 # routes a carrier i is serving at t
Characteristics Directirt 1 Percentage of direct ights in all tickets of irt
irt: a carrier i on route r at time t, iat: a carrier i at airport a at time t,
it: a carrier i at time t, rt: route r at time t, at: airport a at time t
We interact the bankruptcy indicators with the market share of a bankrupt airline to account for the
possibility that bankrupt airlinesrivalsresponses are di¤erent depending on the market presence of the
bankrupt airline, as each market can be exposed to di¤erent degree of bankruptcy e¤ects. For instance,
even though a bankrupt airline changes capacity at the same rate in all markets, the impact of the change
to competing airlines may be larger in the markets where the bankrupt airline used to be dominant. Here,
the market shares from the periods before a¤ected by bankruptcy are chosen to avoid endogeneity issues
and measure the bankruptcy airlinespresence in the market when una¤ected by bankruptcy. We take a
one-year average since it is a more reliable measure than one-time market share, which is vulnerable to
time-specic shocks. The rivals will then be divided into two groups based on whether the airline is a
LCC or not.
The last column of Table 1.5 is route-level bankruptcy-related variables. Route-level analysis is in-
tended to see the capacity change in total on bankruptcy-a¤ected routes, as a result of nancial distress,
bankruptcy, reemergence, or bankrupt airlinesexit from the market. The comparison group is the set
of routes where no carrier is bankrupt. Bankruptcy indicators, fW [k]rtgk, are again interacted with
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the average market share of bankrupt airlines serving the route for a year from three quarters prior to
bankruptcy ling. Table 1.6 is the list of other variables used in the empirical analyses.
5.2 Empirical Model
We begin with fare and capacity as dependent variables as price and quantity are the main strategic tools
that rms use to compete. We then see the changes in market and capacity shares of bankrupt airlines
and their rivals in the periods surrounding bankruptcies. Maintaining consistency with the conceptual













fW [k]Cirt Bshr[k]Crt  (1 D_lcci) nlcck;C
+W [k]Cirt Bshr[k]Crt D_lcci lcck;Cg
+D_timet  1 +D_fl; qtrrt  2 +Xirt  
+Di  Trendt i +
X
g2G
D_groupg D_timet  !g + uirt
where an observation unit is carrier i on route r at time t (=1998:Q1, 1998:Q2,   , 2008:Q2), log Yirt is
a dependent variable after log-transformation of variables of interest, logMed_fareirt or logN_seatsirt,
K1 and K2 are the set of lead and lag quarters of bankruptcies and bankrupt airlinesexit, respectively
(K1 = fTB   3, TB   2, TB   1, TB, TB +1, TB +2~TRE , TRE +1, TRE +2, TRE +3~g, K2 = fTEX   2,
TEX   1, TEX , TEX + 1, TEX + 2~g), bankruptcy-related variables are as dened in the previous section
with Bshr[k] = Bshr[B] if k 2 K1 and Bshr[E] if k 2 K2, D_lcc is an indicator of a LCC, Xirt is a
set of a constant, local economic conditions e.g. log-transformed value of personal income, population,
and total employment in origin and destination cities, and other control variables such as LCCin, SWin,
Network, and direct if a dependent variable is logMed_fare and LCCin and SWin if a dependent
variable is logN_seats,22 D_timet is a set of time-specic dummies for year-quarter pairs, D_fl; qtrrt
is a set of quarter dummies for Florida route,23 Di is an indicator of a carrier i (2 I = set of all carriers),
Trend is a linear time trend (=1 if 1998Q1,    , =42 if 2008Q2), Di is an indicator of a carrier i (2 I =
set of all carriers), D_groupg is an indicator of a carrier group that has one if i belongs to group c
(2 C = fLegacy, LCC, Otherg), and uirt is the combination of a time-invariant route-carrier xed e¤ect
(ir) and a random shock to a carrier-route pair at time t (irt), i.e. uirt = ir + irt.
The strength of the data set is its panel structure, which enables us to control for time-constant
individual heterogeneity. We will exploit this by employing a xed e¤ects model with a carrier-route
pair as a panel ID. The xed e¤ects model is chosen to allow an individual e¤ect to be correlated with
other explanatory variables including bankruptcy-related variables. We assume that the e¤ect of a spe-
cic carrier-route pair on fare/capacity level has a time-invariant component (ir) and a random shock
22See Table 6 for the description of variables. Some control variables, such as network variables and the fraction of direct
ights, seem to be related to a fare premium or discount but not to quantity level. So, those variables are dropped in the
capacity equations.
23As for the quarter dummies for Florida route, see the paragraph on panel ID and seasonality below.
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component (irt). While the time-invariant component is captured by carrier-route dummies, the random
component varies over time and thus is treated as a usual normal error term (i.e. irt~N(0; 2)).24
In the basic econometric specication, the panel ID is a carrier-route pair. The airline market, however,
is often characterized by seasonality (e.g. demand conditions in the rst quarter di¤er from those in the
third quarter), so a carrier-route-quarter combination may be another appropriate candidate for the panel
ID. There is a trade-o¤ between these two choices of the panel ID. If we choose a carrier-route-quarter
combination over a carrier-route pair, we can better control for seasonal adjustment, but we will have
much shorter data periods25 that we can use to estimate but forfare/capacity level, which may lead to
a biased estimation of counterfactual patterns. On the other hand, though choosing a carrier-route pair
has the disadvantage that we do not control for quarterly adjustment by a carrier on a route, it allows us
to have much longer data periods26 that we can depend on to estimate counterfactual fare and capacity
level but for bankruptcy events.
This study chooses a carrier-route pair as a panel ID over a carrier-route-quarter combination. We
instead include quarter dummies if origin or destination airports are in Florida in addition to time specic
dummy variables (from 1998:Q2 to 2008:Q2: base=1998:Q1). The time-specic dummy variables are
intended to control for aggregate demand and supply shocks common to all routes and carriers or common
quarterly movements in fare and capacity. Quarter dummy variables for routes originating from or destined
to Florida are included because while the quarterly pattern is similar for most of routes (demand is highest
in the third quarter and lowest in the rst quarter), the pattern is reversed in Florida (demand is lowest
in the third quarter and highest in the rst quarter). The estimated coe¢ cients for time specic dummies
and Florida quarter dummies show the expected pattern.27
The key variables are bankruptcy-related variables. The estimates of coe¢ cients on bankruptcy indi-
cators, that is, a series of dummy variables for bankruptcy ling carriers, fD[k]gk, captures the average
impact of nancial distress on the airlines in each quarter surrounding bankruptcy. On the other hand,
the estimated coe¢ cients on the interaction between rivalsbankruptcy and the bankrupt airlinesmarket
share, fW [k]  Bshrgk, show the e¤ect of bankruptcy on rivals which are allowed to vary with di¤erent
level of exposure to the bankruptcy. Bankrupt airlinesrivals fall into one of the two groups, either LCCs
or non-LCCs. The di¤erence (or similarity) in the behaviors of the two groups will help us understand
how airlines have been competing (or not).
Since the dependent variable is log-transformed, the estimated coe¢ cients are interpreted as a semi-
elasticity, i.e. % change in Y , e.g. fare or capacity, in response to a unit change of RHS variable. In
this model, after accounting for carrier-route individual xed e¤ects, the estimates for bankruptcy-related
variables are interpreted as the change in dependent variable of the same airline on the same route when
a¤ected by bankruptcy.
All other empirical analyses are a modication of the basic empirical model. For the airport sample,
24We report Eiker-White Robust Standard Errors clustered in a panel ID to account for potential heterogeneity.
25Note that the panel data is composed of the yearly observations for each carrier-route-quarter combination. So, we have
eleven years of observation at most.
26The panel data is composed of the quarterly observations for each carrier-route pair. So, we have forty two quarters of
observation at most.
27The estimation results are similar even if we do not include the quarterly dummies for Florida or choose a carrier-route-
quarter combination instead.
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the same econometric specication is used except that a panel ID is now a carrier-airport pair. The
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where an observation unit is route r at time t (=1998:Q1, 1998:Q2,   , 2008:Q2), log Yirt is a log-
transformed value of the total route capacity measured by the number of available seats (logN_seats_allrt)
or the number of departures (logN_flights_allrt), W [k]rt is the indicator that bankruptcy ling airlines
are serving the route as detailed in section 1.5.1, Bshrrt and D_timet are the same as before, Zrt is the
set of a constant, local economic conditions and other control variables LCCin, SWin, and, lastly, urt
is the combination of a time-invariant route xed e¤ect (r) and a random shock to a route r at time t
(rt), i.e. urt = r + rt. In this model, a panel ID is a route.
6 Results
This section reports and discusses the estimation results. Do bankrupt airlines harm rivals by increasing
competitive pressure, as is often claimed? Do bankruptcies signal a depressed market uninviting to entry
and expansion? We examine whether bankrupt airlines under protection harm their competitors by
triggering a fare war and keeping or expanding capacities (with unfaircost advantages). The results do
not support the accusation of potential harm of bankruptcy protection to rivals, especially to LCC rivals.
The fare cuts by bankrupt airlines are not so e¤ective that they push others to follow suit, and the slack
from bankrupt airlinescapacity cut is lled by other airlines eventually, leaving the total route capacity
level largely una¤ected. In particular, we nd that LCCs expand while bankrupt rivals reduce capacities.
That is, the services that used to be provided by bankrupt airlines are now replaced by LCCs after they
reduced operations. The route sample analysis shows how market competition plays out in the periods
surrounding airline bankruptcies.
The airport sample analysis supplements the ndings in the sense that it can inform us more about how
the xed gates and time slots at airports are redistributed between airlines and how airlines reorganize
their route structures between bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy routes in the periods surrounding
bankruptcy. For example, if bankrupt airlines reduce capacity but toughen price competition at the same
time, rivals may choose to use the newly available facilities from the reduction to increase services on
other routes una¤ected by bankruptcies. From the route sample analysis, we found that LCCs expand
whereas non-LCC rivals are reducing services on bankruptcy routes. The airport sample analysis in
Section 1.6.2 shows that rivals expand while bankrupt airlines shrink. The expansion during the period
is more prominent for LCCs. The results suggest that bankrupt airlines capacity cutbacks give new
openings for their rivals on average, but non-LCC competitors avoid bankruptcy routes and use the
newly available facilities/slots to expand services on other routes, possibly because LCCspresence is
growing and so is the competitive pressure on the bankruptcyroutes. That is, LCC expansion during
rivalsbankruptcies, rather than the presence of bankrupt airlines on a route per se, may toughen the
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Figure 2: % Median Fare Change in the Periods Surrounding Bankruptcy, Bankrupt Airlines
competition on the bankruptcyroutes.
6.1 Do Bankrupt Airlines Harm Rivals?
We begin with fare and capacity change as price and quantity settings are the basic tools to compete. In
particular, we present the event study graphs in the periods surrounding airline bankruptcies.
Figure 228 reports the estimation results on median fare.29 Model F1 includes LCCin, SWin,
Network, Direct, and the dummy variables for each pair of year and quarter (i.e. time-specic ef-
fects) for controls. Model F2 adds carrier-specic linear time trends and year-quarter dummy variables
for each carrier group (Legacy, LCC, or Other) to account for heterogeneity between carriers. We consider
Model F2 as our conservative and main model. Model F3 includes local economic conditions: personal
income, employment, and population in origin and destination cities. The samples used in Models F1,
F2 and F3 do not match exactly (see the sample size N) due mostly to the lack of data on recent local
economic conditions. In particular, Model F3 does not cover non-MSAs and the quarters in 2008. Also,
the analysis with Model F3 does not cover the second bankruptcies of Aloha and ATA Airlines (which
ended in liquidation) and the bankruptcy of Frontier airline. Considering that these bankrupt events
compose a large portion of samples for otherbankruptcies, the di¤erences in estimates between Models
F2 and F3 may be caused by the di¤erence in bankruptcy events covered in the analysis.
T (B) is the quarter of bankruptcy ling, T (RE) is the quarter of reemergence from bankruptcy, that
is, the last quarter in bankruptcy, and T (EX) is the quarter of exit by a bankrupt airline from a route.
For bankrupt airlines, the fare change is measured by dummy variables indicating each period surrounding
bankruptcy, which would capture an average change. The estimated coe¢ cients are labeled and marked
with * if signicant at 10%, ** if signicant at 5%, and *** if signicant at 1%. Throughout this paper,
28Model F1: N=182,437, R2=0.1129, Model F2: N=182,437, R2=0.1528, Model F3: N=169,430, R2=0.1564
T(B)=Quarter of bankruptcy ling, T(RE)=Last quarter in bankruptcy
* if signicant at 10%, ** if signicant at 5%, *** if signicant at 1%
29The table of regression result for Model F2 is in the Appendix, Table A1.
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we do not label estimates for the model with local conditions because the estimates are not dramatically
di¤erent from those of model without those local conditions in most cases.
The rst graph shows the fare change for bankrupt legacy carriers. Fares decrease about 3-5% even
prior to bankruptcy ling. Once a legacy airline les for bankruptcy, the median fare is even lower,
over 7% in the rst two quarters in bankruptcy and about 4.4% later, as compared to normal periods
before they are at risk of bankruptcy. These fare cuts are not negligible even as compared to average
quarterly fare change (about 3%). The bankrupt airlines fares show a modest upward trend after the
early periods in bankruptcy, though it does not return to the original level. The second graph shows the
fare change for other non-legacy bankrupt airlines (low-cost or regional airlines). Although it shows a
sign of fare decrease, the decrease is not statistically signicant in Models F2 and F3. The median fare is
signicantly lower in the quarter of bankruptcy than normal and the size of fare decrease is even larger
during bankruptcy.
The bankrupt airlinesfare cuts appear to be initiated by nancial distress prior to an actual bankrupt
ling, and the sizes of fare cuts become larger in bankruptcy. Likely explanations for the fare cuts prior to
the ling are that the cuts are desperate moves of the near-bankruptcy airlines to avoid bankruptcy ling
and liquidation or that the near-bankruptcy airlines that think an immediate liquidation is highly unlikely
expect the substantial cost reduction under Chapter 11 and cut fares in advance. Bankrupt airlines tend
to maintain low fares even after reemergence. Unlike the previous ndings reported by Borenstein and
Rose (1995), the fare cuts do not quickly dissipate after bankruptcy ling. Therefore, we cannot conclude
that nancial distress explains all the fare cuts by bankrupt airlines and bankruptcy ling itself does not
have an impact on the fare cuts. The deep discount upon bankruptcy ling indicates that bankruptcy
ling itself has some e¤ect on fares; consumers may discount bankrupt airlines and/or their rivals may
cut fares to hurt the weakened airlines in bankruptcy and even chase them out of a market.
For the competitors to bankrupt airlines, we use the interaction between bankrupt airlinespresence
(average market share for four quarters before a¤ected by bankruptcy or that before a¤ected by bankrupt
airlinesexit: Bshr as dened in Section 1.5.1) and the bankruptcy indicator as detailed in Section 1.5.1.
The bankrupt airlines normal market shares are considered to allow for di¤erent levels of the e¤ects
depending on di¤erent degrees of exposure to rivalsbankruptcy. The estimates labeled in the graphs
are the coe¢ cient estimates from regression and average market share of bankrupt airlines on a route
in each case (legacyor otherbankruptcy, bankrupt legacy airlinesor bankrupt non-legacy airlines
exit). The bankrupt share is about 25% on average on bankruptcy routes for both legacy and
otherbankruptcies, and its distribution is right-skewed. The average bankruptshare on routes where
bankrupt airlines exit is about 5% for legacybankruptcies and it is about 10% for otherbankruptcies.
Thus, the graph shows the e¤ect of exposure to rivalsbankruptcy measured at average bankruptshare
(i.e. Bshr). For example, the estimated change in fares of bankrupt airlines rivals when bankrupt
airlinesnormal market share is 25% is the estimated coe¢ cient multiplied by 0.25. Figure ?? reports the
estimation results for legacybankruptcies, and Figure ?? shows the results for otherbankruptcies.
Prices are strategic complements. So, the fare cuts by bankrupt airlines may push others to follow
suit, as is often claimed. In case of legacy bankruptcy, non-LCC rivals tend to follow the bankrupt
airlinesfare cuts in the previous quarter of bankruptcy ling and the rst two quarters of bankruptcy
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Figure 3: % Median Fare Change in the Periods Surrounding "Legacy" Bankruptcy, Rivals
while LCC rivalsmedian fares are cut only in the quarter of bankruptcy ling but the fare is una¤ected
in the rest of the periods of the bankruptcy. Even the fare cuts by rivals upon legacybankruptcy are
not signicant as compared to those of bankrupt airlines. Thus, bankrupt airlinesfare cuts do not appear
to put competitive pressure on their rivals to match the substantial fare cuts. In the post-bankruptcy
periods after reemergence, however, bankrupt legacy airlines keep lower fares, and the fares eventually
decrease for both LCC and non-LCC rivals. The lowered fare levels for all airlines in the long term may
indicate the toughened competition after, rather than during, bankruptcy.
If an outright, immediate liquidation of a large carrier would have improved protability for remaining
airlines, as is often claimed, we should expect to see fare increases after a bankrupt airline withdraws all
the services from a route (After Exit). The results do not support this view.
The changes in rivals fares in the periods surrounding legacy airlines bankruptcy are mostly not
statistically signicant. The fares of non-LCC rivals have increased until the quarter of bankrupt airlines
exit (T (EX)), but they quickly decreased after. The median fares of LCC rivals, on the other hand, show
sign of decrease after a bankrupt carrier exits a route. As we will see in the capacity change analysis,
this may be because LCCs have expanded after a bankrupt airline is gone and competitive pressure has
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Figure 4: % Median Fare Change in the Periods Surrounding "Other" Bankruptcy, Rivals
increased with it, as seen on the bankruptcyroutes.
In addition, it is noteworthy that the Trans World Airlines (TW) is acquired by American Airlines
(AA), and hence its exit from a route may indicate the transfer of its assets to American Airlines. So, it
is possible that the merged airline tried to raise fares but the fare increase did not last long due to the
increased competitive pressure from LCC growth on the route.
In sum, while legacy airlines engage in signicant fare cuts in bankruptcy, their rivalsfares do not
change signicantly during the same period, which indicates that the bankrupt airlinesfare cuts are not
as e¤ective as often argued. Rather, their fares decreased in the post-bankruptcy periods. This result
suggests that competition may have toughened as LCCs expanded during legacy rivalsbankruptcies. It is
also likely that those bankrupt legacy carriers managed to cut cost levels under Chapter 11 and reemerged
as more e¢ cient and stronger competitors.
In case of other (non-legacy) bankruptcies, competitors seem to set lower fares in the pre-bankruptcy
periods and the quarter of bankruptcy ling, but not in the rest of the periods of bankruptcy. The pattern
suggests the possibility that rivals of bankrupt airlines, but not the bankrupt airlines, themselves, may
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have put price competitive pressures, as an attempt to push the weakened airlines under nancial distress
to bankruptcy, and hopefully even to liquidation. During bankruptcy after bankruptcy ling, the fare
changes are negligible for both LCC and non-LCC rivals. In the post-bankruptcy periods, however, the
rivals seem to keep their fares lower than usual in the long term. The fares of LCC rivals are signicantly
lower than normal right before a bankrupt airline exits a market but they rise after the exit. The fares
of non-LCC rivals are higher than usual near and right after reemergence, but the fares decrease in the
later periods.
The estimated coe¢ cients on other variables seem to make sense. First of all, in the fare equation
Model F1, when LCCs are present on a route (LCCin = 1), the median fares are lower by 9.1% (Est.=-
0.0905, SE=0.0065). If the low-cost airline is Southwest (SWin = 1), the fare is even lower by 9.3%
(Est.=-0.0932, SE=0.0086), so the total fare cuts under the presence of Southwest are substantial, about
18.4%. The number of routes a carrier is serving (Network) is positively correlated with median fare level
but the impact of network size does not appear to be large in this model; the fare is higher by 1.9% with
1000 more routes (Est.=0.0185, SE=0.0283). The portion of direct ights (Direct) is positively related
to median fare level: 3% higher with 1 percentage point more direct ights (Est.=0.0299, SE=0.0116).
The results from Model F2 are mostly the same for those variables except for Network (Est.=-0.0886,
SE=0.0064 for LCCin, Est.=-0.0820, SE=0.0085 for SWin, Est.=-0.0226, and Est.=0.0348, SE=0.0113
forDirect). The estimated e¤ect of network size increases signicantly to 9.3% (Est.=0.0931, SE=0.0287).
In the results from Model F3, the log-transformed values of employment level and personal income in
the origin and destination cities are statistically signicant with positive e¤ects on median fares while
the estimates on population variables are insignicant (Est.=0.1643, SE=0.0903 for logEmp_origin,
Est.=0.1572, SE=0.0880 for logEmp_dest, Est.=-0.1132 SE=0.0525 for log Inc_origin, Est.=-0.1086,
SE=0.0499 for log Inc_dest, Est.=0.0361, SE=0.0834 for logPop_origin, and Est.=0.0270, SE=0.0832
for logPop_dest).
The same analysis on the 25th percentile and 75th percentile fares, though not reported here, shows a
similar pattern. One thing to note is that, as compared to median fares, 25th percentile fares change less
while 75th percentile fares change more. In particular, 25th percentile fares set by LCCs change little during
legacy rivalsbankruptcies whereas 75th percentile fares of bankrupt legacy airlines decrease substantially
and those of their LCC rivals decrease in the rst two quarters of those legacy rivalsbankruptcies. The
results suggest that bankruptcy has a larger impact on the upper percentiles of fares than on the lower
percentiles of fares.
Now, lets take a look at the other side of competition: capacity setting. The results on fares raise
questions on capacities. First, are bankrupt airlines keeping or expanding capacities to make up the low
fares with volume? Second, are their rivals reducing operations to support the fare level? The next three
graphs, Figures 5-6 show bankrupt airlinesand their non-LCC and LCC rivalsaverage capacity levels
as compared to counterfactuals in each period surrounding bankruptcies, respectively.30
Throughout the paper, capacity is measured by the number of available seats unless otherwise stated.31
30The table of regression results for Model C2 is in the Appendix, Table A2.
31Capacity can be measured in the number of available seats, available seat miles (ASM), or the number of scheduled
departures (i.e. number of ights). The most common measure of capacity in the industry is ASM. In the route sample
analyses, since the distance between origin and destination of a route does not change over time, the number of available
seats and ASM are basically the same measure. In the airport sample analyses, both of the measures are considered and the
31
Figure 5: % Capacity Change in the Periods Surrounding Bankruptcy, Bankrupt Airlines
Figure 6: % Capacity Change in the Periods Surrounding "Legacy" Bankruptcy, Rivals
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Figure 7: % Capacity Change in the Periods Surrounding "Other" Bankruptcy, Rivals
The capacity change is estimated by three empirical models with di¤erent RHS variables. Model C1 is
the basic empirical model including year-quarter dummies and LCCin and SWin for controls. Model
C2 includes carrier-specic linear time trends as an attempt to control for potential pre-existing growth
patterns and carrier-group-specic year-quarter dummy variables to account for changes in relative at-
tractiveness and e¢ ciency over time. The model is intended to control for time-variant heterogeneity
between carriers.32 Lastly, we add local economic conditions in Model C3. The estimated coe¢ cients are
labeled for Model C1 and C2. The statistical signicance is marked next to the estimates as in the fare
graphs.
The estimation results shown in Figure 533 suggest that bankrupt airlines reduce their operations
results are similar. So, we report only the results on ASM for the airport sample.
32We need to be careful in interpreting the results from Model C2 since the carrier-specic time trends may be capturing
a large portion of the changes spurred by bankruptcies. One thing to see would be whether the di¤erence between estimated
coe¢ cients from the two models is large at the beginning of the event periods (i.e. three quarters prior to bankruptcy ling
in this study). If the di¤erence is negligible, it is likely to indicate that pre-existing trends do not exist and the coe¢ cients
on carrier-specic time trends actually pick up bankruptcy e¤ects.
33Model C1: N=82,333, R2=0.0662, Model C2: N=82,333, R2=0.0828, Model C3: N=75,407, R2=0.0882
T(B)=Quarter of bankruptcy ling, T(RE)=Last quarter in bankruptcy
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substantially as they near bankruptcy. This capacity reduction continues even in the post-bankruptcy
periods, so the capacity level is cut by about 20% for legacy bankrupt airlines and by about 40% for other
bankrupt airlines in the long term (in our conservative model, Model C2). Adding local conditions to
Model C2 (i.e. Model C3) does not change the result much.
During the same period, how do rivals to bankrupt airlines set capacities? Figure 6 presents capacity
changes for rivals in the periods surrounding legacy carriersbankruptcy. Interestingly, the estimation
results show that LCCs tend to expand whereas non-LCCs rather shrink during rivalsbankruptcies. In
particular, non-LCC rivalscapacities show a steep decrease while a legacy carrier is in bankruptcy, by
around 15% at largest when measured at average bankrupt share (=25%). The capacities appear to
bounce back with rivalsreemergence but go down again in the long term.
On the other hand, LCC rivals show an upward trend in capacity evel while a legacy carrier is
bankrupt in all models. After controlling for heterogeneity between carriers, the estimated coe¢ cient on
the period three quarters prior to a legacy carriers bankruptcy becomes negative and signicant. This
may indicate that including carrier-specic time trends are over-capturing the potential growth trend. In
other words, this may suggest that the growth of LCCs had been rather slower on bankruptcyroutes
than on other una¤ected routes before legacy carriersbankruptcy and then accelerated as the legacy
rivals near bankruptcy. Thus, the LCC growth spurred by legacy rivalsbankruptcies would be larger
than the estimates from Model C2. We can see that most of the LCC growth from pre-bankruptcy periods
occurred during, rather than after, a rivals bankruptcy.
A bankrupt airlines capacity cut can be interpreted as an e¤ort to reduce total expenses quickly and
to regain a proper liquidity level. This e¤ort would not stop at reducing services. Bankrupt airlines also
drop relatively unprotable routes as a means to reduce capacity and hence cut costs. The After Exit
graphs show the responses of remaining airlines to bankrupt airlinesexit from a market. Throughout the
periods surrounding the exit, non-LCC rivals seem to maintain fewer seats than normal but show signs
of increase though the estimates are not statistically signicant. In the long term, the capacity level does
not appear to be di¤erent from the normal level. During the same period, LCC rivals increase capacities,
which leads to about 10% more seats than usual in the long term if the bankrupt airline used to hold 5%
market share (which is the average bankruptshare on routes where a bankrupt legacy carrier exited).
Though not reported here, the results do not change when we use the number of scheduled departures
instead of the number of available seats as a measure of capacity.
Figure 7 reports the capacity changes for rivals in the periods surrounding other (non-legacy)bank-
ruptcy. Unlike in legacy bankruptcy, the growth pattern is not much di¤erent between LCC and
non-LCC rivals. Throughout the periods, both LCC and non-LCC show signs of increase in capacity.
The results seem to be consistent with the fact that the bankrupt airlines have been signicant competi-
tors, although they ended up in bankruptcy, and their weakened market presence gives all other rivals
the opportunities to expand.
In the regression results from Model C1, the presence of a LCC (LCCin=1) does not have a signicant
relationship with capacity level, whereas Southwest is positively and signicantly related to capacity levels
(Est.=0.0175, SE=0.0210 for LCCin, and Est.=0.0669, SE=0.0327 for SWin). After controlling for
* if signicant at 10%, ** if signicant at 5%, and *** if signicant at 1%
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Figure 8: % Market Share Change in the Periods Surrounding Bankruptcy, Bankrupt Airlines
Figure 9: % Capacity Share Change in the Periods Surrounding Bankruptcy, Bankrupt Airlines
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time-variant heterogeneity between carriers (Model C2), the estimated coe¢ cients are higher and more
signicant (Est.=0.0293, SE=0.0223 for LCCin, and Est.=0.0794, SE=0.0349 for SWin). Including local
economic conditions does not change the estimates on the two variables. The log-transformed values of
employment level in the destination city and personal income in the origin city are positive and signicant
at 1% and 5%, respectively (Est.=0.5618. SE=0.3996 for logEmp_origin, Est.=1.1403, SE=0.4215 for
logEmp_dest, Est.=0.5360, SE=0.2267 for log Inc_origin, Est.=0.2745, SE=0.2433 for log Inc_dest,
Est.=0.1194, SE=0.3745 for logPop_origin, and Est.=-0.2483, SE=0.3894 for logPop_dest).
How would market and capacity shares change in the periods surrounding bankruptcy? Figures 8-13
present the estimated change in the two measures of market presence in those periods. Market share
is dened as a carriers share on a route in terms of passenger enplanements whereas capacity share is
measured as a carriers share in terms of the number of seats available.
Models MS1 and CS1 do not account for time-variant heterogeneity between carriers as they includes
only year-quarter dummy variables to control for aggregate shocks common to all carriers. Meanwhile,
Models MS2 and CS2 include carrier-specic time trends and year-quarter dummy variables for each
carrier group.
The results are consistent with the ndings in the analysis on capacity changes that LCC rivals actively
expand their presence while bankrupt airlines, especially legacy carriers, shrink their operations. Market
and capacity shares move together, and the movements over the course of bankruptcy are mostly consistent
with the capacity changes presented before. In particular, Figures 834 and 935 show that bankrupt legacy
carriers experience signicant declines in both market share and capacity share on routes as they near
bankruptcy. We have seen that a large portion of capacity reductions by bankrupt airlines occurs in
the pre-bankruptcy periods, which is consistent with the patterns of market and capacity share changes.
While the market and capacity shares of bankrupt legacy carriers are even lower after reemergence than
during bankruptcy, those of bankrupt non-legacy carriers record the lowest point right after reemergence
and appear to regain some of the shares, although not all the way up to the normal levels.
The loss in market and capacity shares of bankrupt airlines is signicant. To whom are the bankrupt
airlines losing their market and capacity shares?
Figures 10 and 11 show the changes in market and capacity shares for bankrupt legacy airlinesrivals.
Non-LCC rivals tend to have the same or lower market and capacity shares in the periods of interest as
compared to normal times whereas LCC rivals have won both market and capacity shares on bankruptcy
routes throughout the periods. The growth pattern of LCCs is even more prominent if we look at capacity
shares.
Once a bankrupt airline exits from a route, other airlines, especially LCCs, seem to win market share
at least in the later periods. Non-LCC rivalsmarket share shows a jump upon bankruptcy airlinesexit.
Part of the jump is likely to be caused by the acquisition of TWA by American Airlines. The capacity
and market shares of LCC rivals tend to be higher in pre- and post- exit of bankrupt airlines than normal.
34Model MS1: N=182,437, R2=0.0502, Model MS2: N=182,437, R2=0.0862, Model MS3: N=169,430, R2=0.0902
T(B)=Quarter of bankruptcy ling, T(RE)=Last quarter in bankruptcy
* if signicant at 10%, ** if signicant at 5%, and *** if signicant at 1%
35Model CS1: N=82,333, R2=0.0556, Model CS2: N=82,333, R2=0.0741, Model CS3: N=75,407, R2=0.0743
T(B)=Quarter of bankruptcy ling, T(RE)=Last quarter in bankruptcy
* if signicant at 10%, ** if signicant at 5%, and *** if signicant at 1%
36
Figure 10: % Market Share Change in the Periods Surrounding "Legacy" Bankruptcy, Rivals
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Figure 11: % Capacity Share Change in the Periods Surrounding "Legacy" Bankruptcy, Rivalsn
Therefore, bankruptcy of legacy carriers appears to present new growth opportunities, at least for their
e¢ cient, LCC rivals.
Figures 12 and 13 report the estimation results for otherbankruptcies. In this case, both non-LCC
and LCC rivals tend to increase in market and capacity shares as in the analysis of capacity changes,
although the patterns are not as robust as in the analysis of legacybankruptcies.
So far, we have seen carrier-level changes in fare, capacity, and market/capacity shares in the periods
surrounding bankruptcy. The main ndings are that bankrupt airlines cut fares as well as capacities,
and LCC rivals do not match the fare cuts and expand capacities and market presence. In addition, this
pattern is even more prominent when a bankrupt airline is a legacy carrier and its market share used to
be higher on a route in normal times before a¤ected by bankruptcy. Thus, bankrupt airlinesfare cuts
are not e¤ective enough to hurt their rivals. Moreover, bankrupt airlines do reduce capacities and their
disappearance from a route does not appear to help others to increase protability in the case of legacy
bankruptcies.
The rivalsfare cuts in the post-bankruptcy periods suggest that, though bankrupt carriers may have
triggered fare cuts in the beginning, it could be their capacity cuts that increase price competition by
38
Figure 12: % Market Share Change in the Periods Surrounding "Other" Bankruptcy, Rivals
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Figure 13: % Capacity Share Change in the Periods Surrounding "Other" Bankruptcy, Rivals
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Figure 14: % Capacity Change at Airport in the Periods Surrounding Bankruptcy, Bankrupt Airlines:
Capacity Measured by Available Seat Miles (ASM)
allowing LCCs to expand. The LCC expansion raises competitive pressure, not only for legacy carriers
but also for LCCs themselves, as average competitors are stronger. In sum, bankrupt airlines per se do not
seem to harm rivalsprotability. Instead, the increasing exposure to LCCs can be more signicant. In
particular, cost-e¢ cient airlines reap the benets from bankrupt airlinescapacity cutbacks and expand,
leading to even ercer competition. In other words, the industry transition in favor of more e¢ cient and
stronger players may have been facilitated by bankruptcies and the capacity cuts associated with them.
The LCCs benet today as bankrupt rivals shrink, but the competition appears to get tougher as the
rivals become stronger.
6.2 Using the Airport Sample
This is a supplementary section that conrms the ndings in the previous section and highlights how
capacities are redistributed between airlines during bankruptcy and how airlines reorganize their route
structures between bankruptcyand non-bankruptcyroutes, given xed facilities and slots of airport.
Airport is rather a set of xed resources than a market. In this sense, while the route sample analysis
shows how market competition plays out in the periods surrounding airline bankruptcies, the airport
sample analysis focuses how the resources are redistributed between airlines. Bankrupt airlinescapacity
cutbacks may provide room for other airlines to expand. The growth of LCCs at airports spurred by
bankruptcy of rivals that have been operating at the airport may indicate the existence of barriers from
xed facilities and slots.
For the airport sample, the same empirical models will be used as for the route sample, except we
replace route with airport and dependent variables will be the capacity measured by available seat miles
(which is the most common measure of airline capacity) and airport market share.
First, Figures 1436-16 are the event study graphs from estimation results for airline capacity changes
36Model AC1: N=59,359, R2=0.0807, Model AC2: N=59,359, R2=0.1750, Model AC3: N=51,950 R2=0.1987
T(B)=Quarter of bankruptcy ling, T(RE)=Last quarter in bankruptcy
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Figure 15: % Capacity Change at Airport in the Periods Surrounding "Legacy" Bankruptcy, Rivals:
Capacity Measured by Available Seat Miles (ASM)
at bankruptcyairports.37 Models AM1-AM3 are comparable to Models C1-C3 used for the estimation
of airline capacity changes on bankruptcyroutes. Although not reported here, the analyses using other
measures of capacity such as the number of available seats or the number of scheduled ights led to similar
conclusions.
As in the route sample analysis, the estimation result using the airport sample shows the pattern that
LCCs expand while bankrupt airlines shrink. The di¤erence is that non-LCC rivals also show signs of
increase in capacity during the same period, although the LCC expansion is greater. Considering that
non-LCC rivals tend to reduce capacity while a legacy carrier is in bankruptcy, the result suggests that
non-LCC rivals avoid bankruptcy routes but pick up the resources available at bankruptcyairports
after bankrupt airlines reduced operations.
A likely explanation for this nding is that the presence of bankrupt airlines on a route is associated
with deteriorated protability of serving the route for non-LCC rivals due to the rising presence of LCCs
* if signicant at 10%, ** if signicant at 5%, and *** if signicant at 1%
37The table of regression result for Model AM2 is in the Appendix, Table A3.
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Figure 16: % Capacity Change at Airport in the Periods Surrounding "Other" Bankruptcy, Rivals:
Capacity Measured by Available Seat Miles (ASM)
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Figure 17: % Airport Market Share Change in the Periods Surrounding Bankruptcy, Bankrupt Airlines
on the route. LCC expansion by picking up the slack from rivalsbankruptcy, rather than bankruptcy
itself, may toughen the competition on bankruptcyroutes. In short, while non-LCC rivals may benet
from bankrupt airlinescapacity cutbacks as, for example, terminals and time slots are newly available
for them to use, they appear to avoid the increasing competition with LCCs on bankruptcyroutes.
In the regression results from Model AM1, the presence of a LCC (LCCin=1) has a signicant neg-
ative relationship with capacity level whereas the estimate on the presence of Southwest (SWin=1) is
positive and insignicant (Est.=-0.0386, SE=0.0212 for LCCin, and Est.=0.0272, SE=0.0228 for SWin).
Controlling for time-variant heterogeneity between carriers (Model AM2) does not change the estimates
signicantly (Est.=-0.0305, SE=0.0160 for LCCin, and Est.=0.0142, SE=0.0177 for SWin). After in-
cluding local economic conditions, we get a more negative and signicant relationship between LCCin
and ASM while the estimate on SWin remains the same (Est.=-0.0507, SE=0.0163 for LCCin, and
Est.=0.0142, SE=0.0170 for SWin). The log-transformed value of personal income at the airport city
has a positive and signicant relationship with airline capacity at 1% signicance level, whereas those of
employment level and population at the airport city do not have a statistically signicant relationship
with airline capacity (Est.=0.3735, SE=0.3092 for logEmp, Est.=0.4742, SE=0.1535 for log Inc, and
Est.=0.4535, SE=0.3257 for logPop).
Figures 1738-19 show the estimation results on airport market share change in the periods surrounding
bankruptcy. Airport market share is measured in terms of passengers originated from the airport. Models
AMS1 and AMS2 are comparable to Models MS1 and MS2 (or Models CS1 and CS2) employed in the
analysis of share changes using the route sample. Although not reported here, the analyses using other
measures of market presence, such as the share of available seats, the share of available seat miles, or the
share of scheduled departures, led to similar results.
Figure 17 shows that bankrupt airlines maintain lower market share than normal throughout the
38Model AMS1: N=59,359, R2=0.0856, Model AMS2: N=59,359, R2=0.1770, Model AMS3: N=51,950 R2=0.1874
T(B)=Quarter of bankruptcy ling, T(RE)=Last quarter in bankruptcy
* if signicant at 10%, ** if signicant at 5%, and *** if signicant at 1%
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Figure 18: % Airport Market Share Change in the Periods Surrounding "Legacy" Bankruptcy, Rivals
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Figure 19: % Airport Market Share Change in the Periods Surrounding "Other" Bankruptcy, Rivals
periods of interest, although the market share shows signs of recovery in the long term. The market share
changes for rivals during a legacy carriers bankruptcy are consistent with the results from airline capacity
changes at bankruptcyairports. In particular, both LCC and non-LCC rivals saw increase in market
share over legacy airlinesbankruptcies. The market share increase is greater for LCC rivals.
In Figure 18, it is noteworthy that the di¤erences between estimates from Models AMS1 and AMS2 for
rivals are noticeable only after a legacy carrier led for bankruptcy. The pattern is even more prominent for
LCC rivals. This suggests that the carrier-specic time trends are over-capturing the potential systematic
changes in market shares. Thus, the market share increase for LCCs will be higher than the estimates
from Model AMS2 and close to those from Model AMS1 without the time trends.
In other bankruptcy, both LCC and non-LCC rivals show an upward trend in market share over
the course of bankruptcy. However, the increase is now greater for non-LCC rivals. This may be in part
because some bankrupt non-legacy airlines are acquired by legacy airlines or because LCCs may have a
substantial presence already on those routes a¤ected by otherbankruptcy.
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6.3 Does the Total Route Capacity Change?
We have seen that bankrupt airlines tend to reduce capacity over the course of bankruptcy. If outright
liquidation is to eliminate costly excess capacity kept by bankrupt airlines and improve protability for
other airlines, we should expect to observe a decrease in the total route capacity levels as bankrupt airlines
cut capacities or exit from a market. However, the tendency of capacity increases by LCC rivals, while
bankrupt airlines capacities cut their capacities, suggests that this may not be true. That is, when
bankrupt airlines reduce capacities, LCCs may take this as an opportunity to add to their capacities,
leaving the total route capacity level intact. The estimated total route capacity changes in the periods
surrounding bankruptcy are presented in Figures 20 and 21.39
The total route capacity changes are estimated using three di¤erent models and the results are reported
in Figure 2040. Model R1 is the basic specication with time-specic, year-quarter dummy variables. In
addition, Model R2 includes the presence of a LCC and Southwest (LCCin and SWin) for controls.
Local economic conditions are added in Model R3, so the model covers only MSAs, from 1998:Q1 through
2007:Q4. As detailed in Section 1.5.1, the bankrupt-route indicators (whether there is a bankrupt airline
serving the route) are multiplied by the average market share of the bankrupt airlines in normal times
before a¤ected by the bankruptcies to account for potential heterogeneity of e¤ects depending on the
di¤erent degrees of exposure to bankruptcy.
In the case of legacy bankruptcy, the total route capacity, measured by the number of available
seats, increases right before the bankruptcy ling and then drops until the end quarter of bankruptcy
in the estimation results from Models R1 and R2. Although the capacity decreased over the course of
bankruptcy, given that the average bankruptshare is about 25%, the estimated decline is around 1%.
Even when bankruptshare is 50%, it is only about 2%, which is no larger than the average quarterly
change in the capacity on the routes covered in the sample, 4.8%. The standard deviation of quarterly
capacity adjustment is about 1.9%. Borenstein and Rose (2003) reported that capacity change for two
quarters before and after bankruptcy ling is no larger than usual quarterly capacity adjustment. This
result is consistent with their ndings. In this sense, the decrease in the capacity is statistically signicant
but economically insignicant. In addition, aggregate demand shocks such as September 11 (2001:Q3)
led to over 10% route capacity reduction on average in the sample, so it has a much larger impact on the
capacity level. After reemergence, the total route capacity level seems to recover.
In the case of otherbankruptcy, the total route capacity seems to even increase near bankruptcy.
The capacity drops steeply right after reemergence but returns to the normal level in the long term.
When a bankrupt airline exits from a route, the total route capacity drops substantially, especially when
the bankrupt airline has a high normal market share, and this is true both in legacy and other
bankruptcy. However, the capacity level seems to rebound to the normal level eventually.
Aside from the bankruptcy e¤ects, the presence of a LCC and/or Southwest on a route has a signicant
and positive relationship with the total route capacity level. In Model R2, the capacity is about 10%
higher when a LCC is in, and the presence of Southwest is related to additional 15% higher capacity
39The tables of regression results for Models R2 and RD2 are in the Appendix, Table A4.
40Model R1: N=41,993, R2=0.0814, Model R2: N=41,993, R2=0.1116, Model R3: N=38,678, R2=0.1160
T(B): Quarter of bankruptcy ling, T(RE): Last quarter in bankruptcy, T(EX): Quarter of bankrupt airlinesexit
* if signicant at 10%, ** if signicant at 5%, and *** if signicant at 1%
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Figure 20: % Total Route Capacity Change in the Periods Surrounding Bankruptcy
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level, meaning 25% capacity increase in total when Southwest is in (Est.=0.1015, SE=0.0133 for LCCin,
Est.=0.1545, SE=0.0241 for SWin). Including local economic conditions does not change the estimates
on the two variables meaningfully (Est.=0.1113, SE=0.0149 for LCCin, Est.=0.1345, SE=0.0242 for
SWin). Among local economic conditions, only the log-transformed values of employment levels in
the origin and destination cities are signicant (at 1%) (Est.=0.6911, SE=0.2103 for logEmp_origin,
Est.=0.6536, SE=0.2066 for logEmp_dest, Est.=0.0614, SE=0.1246 for log Inc_origin, Est.=0.0875,
SE=0.1153 for log Inc_dest, Est.=-0.0089, SE=0.1841 for logPop_origin, and Est.=0.0066, SE=0.1857
for logPop_dest).
Moreover, the number of scheduled departures shows little change as compared to the number of
available seats. Figure 2141 shows that the number of scheduled ights even tends to increase over the
course of bankruptcy, where Models RD1-RD3 are comparable to Models R1-R3. The result indicates that
large aircrafts are being replaced by smaller ones on bankruptcyroutes during the periods. As a side
discussion, this suggests that a large carrier would not internalize the congestion problem and choose the
optimal level of congestion because their reduction in schedules would be lled by other airlines, leaving
the total congestion level una¤ected.
As in the estimation results on the total route capacity measured by the number available seats,
estimation on the total route capacity measured by the number of ights show that the presence of a
LCC and/or Southwest on a route has a signicant and positive relationship with the total route ca-
pacity level (Est.=0.1182, SE=0.0139 for LCCin and Est.=0.1269, SE=0.0234 for SWin in Model RD2,
Est.=0.0978, SE=0.0143 for LCCin and Est.=0.1527, SE=0.0233 for SWin in Model RD3). Among
local economic conditions, the estimated coe¢ cients on the log-transformed values of employment lev-
els and personal incomes in the origin and destination cities are positive and signicant (Est.=0.7999,
SE=0.1970 for logEmp_origin, Est.=0.7498, SE=0.1904 for logEmp_dest, Est.=0.2650, SE=0.1173 for
log Inc_origin, Est.=0.3001, SE=0.1086 for log Inc_dest, Est.=0.0151, SE=0.1762 for logPop_origin,
and Est.=0.0189, SE=0.1754 for logPop_dest).
In sum, though we observe signs of decrease in the total route capacity during bankruptcy, the size of
the decrease is neither economically meaningful nor persistent on bankruptcyroutes. Moreover, even
when bankrupt airline actually ceases operation on a route, the total route capacity does not decrease.
The results imply that either the overcapacity problem does not exist in the rst place or the overcapacity
problem, if it exists, does not get worse as a result of bankruptcy protection.
Although the total route capacity does not change meaningfully, the composition of capacity changes
as bankrupt airlines reduce capacities and other airlines ll the gap. We have seen the replacement of
bankrupt airlines capacity by their rivals, especially by LCCs. From the consumers perspective, the
provider of ight services may not be important as long as there is some airline that would provide the
services, that is, if the consumer does not think the quality of the ight services are signicantly di¤erent.
The composition of capacity, however, could matter in terms of allocative e¢ ciency. If bankrupt airlines
are relatively ine¢ cient and are forced to cut back on capacity, then relatively e¢ cient airlines may take
the openings as an opportunity to expand. This is what we have found in the previous section. This
41Model R1: N=41,992, R2=0.0598, Model R2: N=41,992, R2=0.0877, Model R3: N=38,678 R2=0.1853
T(B): Quarter of bankruptcy ling, T(RE): Last quarter in bankruptcy, T(EX): Quarter of bankrupt airlinesexit
* if signicant at 10%, ** if signicant at 5%, and *** if signicant at 1%
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Figure 21: % Total Route Capacity Change in the Periods Surrounding Bankruptcy: Ca-
pacity Measured by Scheduled Departures
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replacement will lead to a lower average cost level and higher e¢ ciency industry-wide. The growth of
LCCs spurred by rivalsbankruptcy, especially by legacy rivalsbankruptcy, leads us to the next question:
what fraction of LCC expansion can be attributed to rivalsbankruptcy? Section 1.7 quanties the e¤ects
for the quarterly 1000 most popular routes during the data period (1998:Q1-2008:Q2).
7 Calculating the Fraction of LCC Growth from RivalsBankruptcy
Given the long history of the airline industry since deregulation in 1978, LCCs, even with substantial
cost advantage over legacy carriers, have not expanded as rapidly and extensively as expected (see Figure
2242). For example, LCCsdomestic passenger share is less than 5% in 1990. This raises a question: what
does it take for e¢ cient airlines to take markets from less e¢ cient incumbents?
The airline industry is likely to have sticky market shares. Incumbent, legacy airlines can be very averse
to reducing capacity for various reasons. For example, capacity reduction may not be easily reversible,
that is, it may be hard for an airline to get terminals or other airport facilities back once it loses them
to other airlines. Thus, keeping capacities may have an option value. Capacity reduction may have a
negative impact of demands for the airlines services, as consumers value frequent ights. Also, since
legacy airlines have many aircrafts and large networks, they may be able to add capacities at low costs.
These reasons may be holding back the incumbent airlines from reducing capacity in normal times when
they do not need any dramatic change immediately. In addition, the facilities and time slots are xed, at
least in the short term, in the airline industry. Even if LCCs can provide comparable services, it may be
hard for them to get access to the resources necessary to operate as long as incumbents do not give them
up. The discrete capacity reduction by incumbents then will provide immediate expansion opportunities
for LCCs whose growth has been limited.
9/11, for example, was the event that urged incumbent airlines to cut capacity signicantly and
discretely. LCCs also reduced capacity in the aftermath of 9/11. However, the retreat did not last long.
LCCs soon expanded by picking up the slack from large network airlinescapacity cutbacks. Although a
bankruptcy is not as exogenous as the 9/11 shock, the risk of being liquidated may urge the airlines to
cut back on capacity as substantially and discretely as 9/11. The empirical results with the route sample
indicate that LCCs lled the vacuum from bankrupt airlinesretreat, suggesting that rivalsbankruptcy
can be a factor that spurs LCC expansion.
Figure 23 shows the quarterly route capacity change by carrier group, as compared to the rst quarter
of 1998, on quarterly 1000 most travelled routes. There is a clear pattern of decline in legacy airlines
capacities and rise in LCCscapacities in the 2000s on those routes. The correlation of the quarterly
changes between legacy airlines and LCCs is about -0.8. The highly negative correlation of capacity levels
between legacy and low cost airlines implies the possibility that at least part of the legacy airlineslost
capacities are replaced by LCCs.
Reverse causality of legacy airlinesbankruptcy and LCC expansion is plausible; competitive pressures
from LCC expansion pushes legacy carriers to le for bankruptcy. However, we try to control for the pre-
existing trend of LCC expansion, if any, by adding carrier-specic time trends. Even after removing the
42Source: Borenstein and Rose (2007) "How Airline Markets Work. . . Or Do They" Figure 7
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Figure 22: Domestic Market Share of Southwest and LCC, 1984-2005
Figure 23: % Capacity Change by Carrier Group on Quarterly 1000 Most Popular Routes (base: 1998Q1)
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systematic growth trend of each carrier, LCCs show the pattern of replacing bankrupt airlinescapacity.
That is, whatever the reason for the bankruptcy is, bankruptcies seemed to prompt LCC rivalsexpansion
even further as LCCs take the openings from bankrupt airlinescapacity cutbacks upon imminent danger
of liquidation as opportunities to expand. Then how large is this e¤ect? That is, what fraction of LCC
growth is spurred by rivalsbankruptcies?
Here we want to quantify the fraction of LCC growth spurred by rivalsbankruptcies. We will restrict
out attention to the growth achieved during rivalsbankruptcies in particular. This will be called the
bankruptcy e¤ectin this section. Based on the estimation results from Models C1-C3, we can calculate
the fraction by taking the following steps.
First, we want to focus on the capacity change for LCCs during rivalsbankruptcies. So the changes
in pre- and post- bankruptcy periods will not be included to quantify the fraction of LCC growth spurred
by rivals bankruptcies. That is, the bankruptcy e¤ect we will estimate includes the change in the
periods in rivals bankruptcy or after bankrupt rivals exit (Kduring  fTB, TB + 1, TB + 2~TRE , TEX ,
TEX + 1, TEX + 2~g). We begin by calculating the counterfactual capacity level of each LCC absent
rivalsbankruptcies. We use the estimates from the regression on capacity with the main route sample.
In particular, the estimated coe¢ cients on LCCs during rivalsbankruptcies will be used (see Figures 6
and 7). For each combination of a LCC i, route r, and time t, the counterfactual capacity level of the





k2K1[K2(d%lgk;r;t +d%othk;r;t)  Capacityi;r;t
where d%lgk;r;t  blcck Bshr[k]lgrt, d%othk;r;t  blcck Bshr[k]othrt , Capacityi;r;t is the actual capacity of LCC i
on route r at time t, and K1, K2 are the same as dened earlier. The total bankruptcy e¤ect until time
t is then easily calculated by taking the di¤erence between actual and counterfactual capacity level:





k2K1[K2(d%lgk;r;t +d%othk;r;t)  Capacityi;r;t
Calculating the fraction of growth that occurred during rivalsbankruptcies takes a few more steps.
As mentioned before, the bankruptcy e¤ect of inducing LCC expansion on each route will come either
from bankrupt airlinescapacity reduction while staying on route or from those airlinesexit from route.
Thus, we need to identify the nal period of each bankruptcy b on route r ( T (b; r)):
T (b; r) =Maxft s.t. k(t) 2 Kduringg
where k(t) is the function that maps from calendar date to event period from pre-bankruptcy to
post-bankruptcy. If bankruptcy ended during the data period, which is almost always the case, the nal
period will fall into either [TB + 2~TRE ] or [TEX + 2~]. Then the bankruptcy e¤ect accumulated from
pre-bankruptcy periods ( Blg for legacy bankruptcies and Both for other bankruptcies) can be calculated
by summing the individual LCC growth induced until the end of rivals bankruptcy on a route over all
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d%othk(T );r;T  ^Capacityi;r;T
where T = T (b; r) and k(T ) is the event period at t = T (which is either [TB + 2~TRE ] or [TEX + 2~]
in most cases). The next step is to take out the changes in pre-bankruptcy periods to capture the
rivals-bankruptcy-motivated LCC growth occurred during rivalsbankruptcies:
















where TB(b) is the quarter of ling for bankruptcy b (so TB(b)   1 is the last period prior to actual
bankruptcy ling of bankruptcy event b). Finally, the fraction of LCC growth during the data time
periods spurred by rivalsbankruptcy can be calculated by dividing the estimated bankruptcy e¤ects by















Table 1.7: Fraction of LCC Growth from RivalsBankruptcy
Bankruptcy Model C1 Model C2 Model C3
(98q1 - 08q2) (98q1 - 08q2) (98q1 - 07q4, MSA only)
Legacy 16.88% 11.26% 11.10%
Other 1.18% 1.48% -2.40%
Total 18.06% 12.74% 8.70%
Model C1 : Basic (Yr-Qtr specic time e¤ects, LCCin, SWin)
Model C2 : Model C1+ Carrier-specic time trends, Carrier-group-specic Yr-Qtr e¤ects
Model C3 : Model C2 + Local economic conditions
The sum of the two fractions can be interpreted as the bankruptcy e¤ect from all rival bankruptcies.
Table 1.7 shows the estimated bankruptcy e¤ects. The estimated fraction of LCC growth explained
by responses to rivals bankruptcy ranged from 13 to 18% depending on which model to use. If we
disentangle the e¤ect into legacy bankruptcies and other bankruptcies, most of the LCC growth spurred
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by rivalsbankruptcy is from legacy bankruptcies. In particular, the fraction explained by legacy rivals
bankruptcies is ranged from 15.5 to 16.9%. We can see that the fraction is signicant, suggesting that
barriers are not negligible in the airline industry.
8 Conclusion
This paper contributes to our understanding in two areas of research. First, the paper gives us a lesson
on the link between nancial conditions and market competition by examining the claim of potential
harms of Chapter 11 bankruptcy to rivals. Second, the ndings that LCCs replace bankrupt, incumbent
legacy airlines and the signicant fraction of LCC growth occurred during legacy airlinesbankruptcy
have implication for barriers to entry and expansion, persistence of market structure, and rm growth.
We begin by studying whether bankrupt airlines harm rivals by engaging in aggressive pricing and
contributing to the overcapacity problem, if it exists. We found little evidence supporting the claim that
bankrupt airlines harm e¢ cient LCC rivals and the industry. Bankrupt airlines do cut fares, but they
also cut capacities. During the same period, their LCC rivals cut fares a little in the beginning of the
bankruptcy, but they also expand capacities signicantly, increasing their market presence. Considering
the nding that the total route capacity is largely una¤ected by bankruptcy, it implies that LCCs replace
capacities of bankrupt airlines, especially those of bankrupt legacy airlines.
The empirical results do not support the claim that Chapter 11 harms bankrupt airlinesrivals and
the industry by allowing a bankrupt airline to shed costs and put competitive pressure on e¢ cient rivals,
as bankrupt airlines do not appear to harm the protability and nancial health of LCCs. However, if the
bankrupt airlines were to have been liquidated immediately and LCCs could have expanded operations
substantially and quickly at low cost, then the e¢ cient carriersgrowth might have been even greater.
In this sense, the rationale for Chapter 11 will depend on the capability of bankrupt airlines to cut costs
down to the level comparable to LCCs.
The additional question naturally follows from the empirical results. The main lesson from the ndings
is that LCCs expand during bankruptcies of rivals, especially those of legacy rivals. This pattern suggests
the existence of barriers that have limited LCC growth. The immediate and substantial capacity reduction
that bankrupt or near-bankruptcy airlines are forced to take will present new opportunities for e¢ cient
airlines to expand. How large a fraction of LCC growth is spurred by rivalsbankruptcy? Section 1.7
estimates the fraction to quantify the e¤ect of rival airlinesbankruptcy on LCC growth. The estimated
fraction ranged from 13 to 18%, and, moreover, most of the growth spurred by rivalsbankruptcy has
been achieved during legacy airline bankruptcies. As LCCs expand while bankrupt legacy airlines shrink,
the competitive pressure will rise. If bankrupt airlines reemerge as nimbler and stronger competitors
with lower cost structures, they will add even more competitive pressure. So it is natural to expect more
competition after, rather than during, bankruptcy, which is shown in the results from the analysis on
fares.
While the paper suggests no special harm of bankruptcy protection to LCC rivals, we need to exercise
more caution when it comes to drawing policy implications. We do not compare the actuals directly with
the counterfacutals in which Chapter 11 option is not available and every bankrupt airline would have been
liquidated immediately. We compare the actuals with the counterfactuals in which the bankrupt airlines
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would have operated as in normal times and thereby draw implications about whether the existence of the
airlines operating under bankruptcy protection is harmful to rivals and the industry. So, if the elimination
of Chapter 11 changes rmsbehavior even when they are not under nancial distress, this paper does
not tell us in what direction the e¤ect would go.
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10 Appendix
The estimation results are reported as a graph in the text. The estimated coe¢ cients for main models
are reported in this appendix. Table 1.1A is on median fare and Table 1.2A is on capacity on the 1000
most popular routes. Table 1.3A is on capacity at the 200 most popular airports. Lastly, Table 1.4A is
on the total route capacity measured by the number of seats or the number of scheduled departures. All
models except for the model for the total route capacity include time-specic e¤ects (i.e. year-quarter
dummy variables), carrier-specic linear time trends, and time-specic e¤ects for each carrier-group (i.e.
year-quarter-carrier group dummy variables; carrier group is a legacy, a LCC, or other).
In the rst column labeled as Variable, [TB   3] - [TB   1] are the pre-bankruptcy period, [TB]
- [TB + 2~TRE ] are during bankruptcy, [TRE + 1] - [TRE + 3~] are the post-bankruptcy period after
reemergence, [TEX 2] - [TEX 1] are the quarters before a bankrupt airlines exit from a route, and [TEX ]
- [TEX+2~] are the quarters after the exit. The column labeled as Bankruptmeans a carrier is bankrupt
and the one labeled as Rival_nlcc(or Rival_lcc) indicates that a carrier is a non-LCC (or LCC) that
serves a route where a bankrupt airline serves. The columns under Legacy Bankruptcyare for legacy
airline bankruptcies whereas the columns under Othersare for other non-legacy airline bankruptcies.
The intersection between Bankruptand an event period ( [TB   3] - [TRE + 3~]) shows the estimated
coe¢ cient on the dummy variable indicating a bankrupt carrier in the event period. For example, the
intersection between Bankrupt and [TB] is the estimated coe¢ cient on the indicator of quarter of
bankrupt ling when a carrier is bankrupt. For bankrupt airlinesrivals (Rival_nlccor Rival_lcc),
the intersection is the estimated coe¢ cient on the interaction between bankrupt airlinesnormal market
share (from the past) and the indicator of bankrupt airlinesrival. Details on the construction of these
variables are in Table 1.5 in Section 1.5.1. So, the estimated coe¢ cients are not directly comparable
to those for bankrupt airlines (Bankrupt). In the text, we multiplied the estimated coe¢ cients with
average normal market share of bankrupt airlines. D_fl; q1-D_fl; q3 are the quarter dummy variables
for Florida. The reported R2 is the within-R2.
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Table 1.1A: Estimation Result - Median Fare
Model F2, Route Sample
Dependent Var. logMed_fare
Legacy Bankruptcy Others
Variable Bankrupt Rival_nlcc Rival_lcc Bankrupt Rival_nlcc Rival_lcc
[TB   3] -.0192*** .0106 -.0039 .0049 -.0851*** -.0795**
(.0048) (.0117) (.0132) (.0080) (.0273) (.0354)
[TB   2] -.0294*** .0015 -.0224 -.0122 -.0078 -.0148
(.0055) (.0134) (.0156) (.0088) (.0267) (.0337)
[TB   1] -.0542*** -.0352*** -.0134 -.0159 -.0680** -.0849***
(.0055) (.0126) (.0145) (.0099) (.0291) (.0316)
[TB ] -.0706*** -.0280** -.0451*** -.0506*** -.0621** -.0644*
(.0062) (.0140) (.0156) (.0111) (.0305) (.0339)
[TB + 1] -.0559*** -.0287** -.0203 -.0916*** .0496 .0271
(.0062) (.0143) (.0178) (.0159) (.0357) (.0528)
[TB + 2~TRE ] -.0442*** .0530*** .0022 -.0756*** .0585* .0232
(.0057) (.0115) (.0159) (.0207) (.0329) (.0423)
[TRE + 1] -.0526*** .0975*** -.0244 -.0399 .1351*** -.2723***
(.0072) (.0139) (.0205) (.0271) (.0389) (.0941)
[TRE + 2] -.0506*** .0541*** -.0746*** -.0762** -.0671 -.2268
(.0073) (.0144) (.0207) (.0362) (.0553) (.1456)
[TRE + 3~] -.0337*** -.0654*** -.0453** -.1738*** -.1189*** -.1503
(.0067) (.0138) (.0200) (.0395) (.0419) (.0914)
[TEX   2] .0556 -.0149 -.1412*** -.1652***
(.0502) (.0856) (.0368) (.0496)
[TEX   1] .1085** -.0420 -.1099*** -.3726***
(.0526) (.0701) (.0405) (.0573)
[TEX ] .4275** -.2118 -.1070** -.2866***
(.1696) (.2407) (.0444) (.0646)
[TEX + 1] .1470 -.2507 -.2029*** -.2029***
(.1528) (.2887) (.0549) (.0719)
[TEX + 2~] -.1250 -.5096*** -.1185*** .0125





D_fl; q1 .0235*** (.0028)
D_fl; q2 -.0013 (.0023)




Bankrupt: bankrupt airline, Rival_nlcc: non-LCC rivals, Rival_lcc: LCC rival
Robust Cluster SE reported in parentheses. N : Sample size
* Signicant at 10 %, ** Signicant at 5 %, *** Signicant at 1 %
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Table 1.2A: Estimation Result - Capacity (Number of Available Seats)
Model C2, Route Sample
Dependent Var. logN_seats
Legacy Bankruptcy Others
Variable Bankrupt Rival_nlcc Rival_lcc Bankrupt Rival_nlcc Rival_lcc
[TB   3] -.0522** -.1395 -.1797** .0607* .2648* .4086**
(.0252) (.1104) (.0885) (.0354) (.1574) (.1811)
[TB   2] -.0815*** -.1707 .0663 .0975*** .1854 .7303***
(.0284) (.1160) (.0757) (.0304) (.1191) (.1740)
[TB   1] -.1312*** -.2048* .0494 -.1265*** .3628** .4964***
(.0351) (.1108) (.0736) (.0472) (.1619) (.1794)
[TB ] -.1081*** -.3955*** .0406 -.1346** .0879 1.2216***
(.0347) (.1103) (.0757) (.0630) (.2767) (.3135)
[TB + 1] -.1145*** -.5826*** .1112 -.3963*** .4601** .2822
(.0349) (.1282) (.0736) (.0738) (.1933) (.2903)
[TB + 2~TRE ] -.0777*** -.2172* .2306*** -.4716*** .5247*** .5207*
(.0291) (.1178) (.0765) (.0781) (.1723) (.2719)
[TRE + 1] -.0525 -.0932 .3262*** -.8905*** .0241 1.5813***
(.0436) (.1233) (.1002) (.1077) (.1437) (.3242)
[TRE + 2] -.1759*** -.1847 .3803*** -.6446*** .2755* 1.9635**
(.0453) (.1280) (.0993) (.0770) (.1456) (.9433)
[TRE + 3~] -.1975*** -.3837*** .3563*** -.3053*** .8851*** 1.4676**
(.0441) (.1255) (.1007) (.0848) (.1403) (.6378)
[TEX   2] -.8013 -1.0410 -.3711* .3735**
(.7069) (.8227) (.1993) (.1712)
[TEX   1] -1.1191* .7795 -.3125 1.4321***
(.6655) (.7714) (.2459) (.3274)
[TEX ] -.3293 .0232 .7131*** 1.0758***
(1.0597) (.7597) (.2398) (.2927)
[TEX + 1] -.8454 1.6176** .6396 1.6503***
(1.1406) (.7903) (.5489) (.2737)
[TEX + 2~] .0061 1.9087*** 1.4034*** 1.3407***
(1.1222) (.5371) (.2842) (.2011)
LCCin .0293 (.0222)
SWin .0793** (.0349)
D_fl; q1 .0747*** (.0126)
D_fl; q2 -.0092 (.0118)




Bankrupt: bankrupt airline, Rival_nlcc: non-LCC rivals, Rival_lcc: LCC rival
Robust Cluster SE reported in parentheses. N_sgmt : Sample size
* Signicant at 10 %, ** Signicant at 5 %, *** Signicant at 1 %
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Table 1.3A: Estimation Result - Capacity (Available Seat Miles)
Model AM2, Airport Sample
Dependent Var. logASM
Legacy Bankruptcy Others
Variable Bankrupt Rival_nlcc Rival_lcc Bankrupt Rival_nlcc Rival_lcc
[TB   3] .0072 .0216 .0541 .0240 .0860 -.4202***
(.0210) (.0512) (.0801) (.0309) (.1246) (.1490)
[TB   2] .0043 .0392 .2335** .0218 .1174 -.4658**
(.0197) (.0595) (.0998) (.0323) (.1268) (.2174)
[TB   1] -.0183 .0263 .2368** -.0605 .1877 -.3647
(.0225) (.0613) (.0949) (.0423) (.1408) (.2614)
[TB ] -.0029 .0251 .2236** -.1138** .5153*** -.4297
(.0238) (.0579) (.0911) (.0462) (.1699) (.3255)
[TB + 1] -.0455 .0778 .2924*** -.0798 .3572** .0348
(.0288) (.0624) (.1082) (.0685) (.1750) (.2592)
[TB + 2~TRE ] -.0680*** .0843 .3930*** -.2475*** .4785*** .1695
(.0243) (.0559) (.1009) (.0884) (.1561) (.2191)
[TRE + 1] -.0514 .2382*** .3027*** -.2734* .6338*** 1.0926***
(.0336) (.0615) (.1133) (.1489) (.2154) (.2248)
[TRE + 2] -.1035*** .2250*** .3727*** -.2192 .9276*** 1.1131***
(.0347) (.0626) (.1203) (.1583) (.1573) (.2450)
[TRE + 3~] -.0281 .2400*** .4278*** .0147 .6631*** 1.0434***
(.0313) (.0613) (.1361) (.1731) (.1373) (.2263)
[TEX   2] .0590 -2.3607** -.2132 -.6578
(.2423) (.9418) (.1951) (.5125)
[TEX   1] .4128*** -1.8611 -.0221 .0764
(.2058) (1.2954) (.2287) (.3999)
[TEX ] .4926*** -.3215 .5447** .2123
(.2282) (.7007) (.2312) (.4292)
[TEX + 1] .1170 -.5160 .5398* .1434
(.2546) (.6878) (.2907) (.3685)
[TEX + 2~] .1551 -.4271 .5044 .4404
(.2174) (.5456) (.3133) (.4490)
LCCin -.0305* (.0160)
SWin .0141 (.0177)
D_fl; q1 .0965*** (.0198)
D_fl; q2 -.0031 (.0122)




Bankrupt: bankrupt airline, Rival_nlcc: non-LCC rivals, Rival_lcc: LCC rival
Robust Cluster SE reported in parentheses. N_sgmt : Sample size
* Signicant at 10 %, ** Signicant at 5 %, *** Signicant at 1 %
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Table 1.4A: Estimation Result - Total Route Capacity
Models R2-RD2, Route Sample
Dependent Var. logN_seats_all logN_flights_all
Bankruptcyroutes Bankruptcyroutes
Variable Legacy bankruptcy Other Legacy bankruptcy Other
[TB   3] .0236** .1070** .0338** .1209*
(.0140) (.0526) (.0136) (.0670)
[TB   2] .0599*** .1421** .0734*** .1129*
(.0155) (.0629) (.0154) (.0628)
[TB   1] .0611*** .1803** .0996*** .1960***
(.0162) (.0709) (.0161) (.0699)
[TB ] .0245 .1504** .0898*** .1947***
(.0177) (.0626) (.0169) (.0629)
[TB + 1] -.0126 .0211 .0583*** .1118
(.0184) (.0695) (.0183) (.0742)
[TB + 2~TRE ] -.0438** .0005 .0619*** .0930
(.0206) (.0854) (.0202) (.0859)
[TRE + 1] -.0275 -.4043** .1233*** -.2789
(.0242) (.1943) (.0241) (.1898)
[TRE + 2] .0037 -.0726 .1429*** .1107
(.0240) (.0793) (.0239) (.0734)
[TRE + 3~] .0114 .0026 .0922*** .1313*
(.0256) (.0631) (.0242) (.0742)
[TEX   2] -.0242*** .0053 -.0330*** .0252
(.0069) (.0165) (.0081) (.0171)
[TEX   1] -.0410*** .0012 -.0393*** .0207
(.0117) (.0148) (.0120) (.0153)
[TEX ] -.2772 -.3904*** -.2623 -.1331
(.2380) (.0957) (.2168) (.1112)
[TEX + 1] -.1726 -.0095 -.0639 .2140*
(.2194) (.0809) (.2184) (.1153)
[TEX + 2~] .1956 .1981*** -.0587 .3257***
(.5222) (.0626) (.5387) (.0689)
LCCin .1015*** (.0132) .1183*** (.0139)
SWin .1548*** (.0241) .1269*** (.0234)
D_fl; q1 .0661*** (.0064) .0493*** (.0068)
D_fl; q2 .0093** (.0036) .0137*** (.0043)
D_fl; q3 -.0533*** (.0063) -.0252*** (.0057)
Constant 4.659*** (.013) 6.623*** (.012)
R2 0.1115 0.0875
N 41,993 41,993
Robust Cluster SE reported in parentheses. N: Sample size
* Signicant at 10 %, ** Signicant at 5 %, *** Signicant at 1 %
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